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ABSTRACT
Why are some junior coalition members able to extract significantly greater conces-
sions from their partners than others? I argue that junior partners are able to do so if
they can credibly threaten to exit the incumbent government. Such exit threats are only
credible if they can enter into alternative governments that are both viable and ideolog-
ically attractive to them. Thus, I expect junior parties to extract greater concessions, the
more exit power they control. I test this hypothesis on three observable implications of
multi-party policy-making. First, I expect government spending to vary systematically
with the strongest party’s bargaining leverage. I find that spending only increases in the
number of governing parties if the strongest party controls relatively little exit power.
The effect is mitigated as its exit power increases. Second, I analyze under what con-
ditions government parties are able to influence how expenditures are allocated across
different spending areas. While all governing parties have the incentive to implement
policies that reward their constituents, only exit power provides them with the means
to implement their ideologically motivated spending preferences. I find that the com-
position of the budget reflects the spending preferences of parties with significant exit
power more closely. Finally, I address why some parties receive more ministerial portfo-
lios than others. I expect parties to receive more, and more important, portfolios if they
can credibly threaten to exit current government negotiations. I present two approaches
x
to estimate ministerial allocation data as unbalanced and irregular compositional data.
In this project, I generate and use a novel measure of parties’ exit power that is com-
parable across countries and over time. It is theoretically motivated and captures par-
ties’ next best options in case of a bargaining breakdown. I simulate all approximately
120,000 potential governments that could have formed in developed democracies during
the postwar era. For each of these governments, I estimate its formation likelihood and
its ideological appeal to each of its members. For each party in government, I calculate




Why are some junior coalition parties able to extract significantly greater concessions
from their coalition partners than others? This is the over-arching puzzle I address in the
following chapters. In line with formal bargaining models, I argue that parties’ next best
options in the case of a bargaining breakdown determine the leverage they can achieve
over their partners in any bargaining situation. The stages in the life-cycle of any govern-
ment, but particularly so in multiparty governments, are marked by continuous bargain-
ing between actors. The first stage involves negotiations over which parties enter gov-
ernment together, which substantive policy program to implement, and how to divide a
finite set of ministerial portfolios among them. Once a government has formed, the bar-
gaining process continues during day-to-day policy-making. While coalition agreements
often set out the broad policy agenda of coalition governments, specifics still need to be
agreed on, and policies have to be passed. This policy-making stage takes place in the
shadow of the coalition negotiation stage because a breakdown of the bargaining process
can, and indeed often does, lead to a government breakdown, after which parties enter a
new stage of bargaining over which government will enter office next.
I argue that a junior partner’s ability to extract concessions is determined by the cred-
ibility of its exit threat. Parties can only credibly threaten to exit the incumbent gov-
ernment if they can enter at least one alternative government that is both viable and
1
ideologically attractive. As such, junior parties that can enter outside options from which
they would derive high utility have great Exit Power. The greater their exit power, the
more concessions these junior coalition members are able to receive from their partners.
I derive three testable propositions based on this general hypothesis and test them on
three observable implications of multiparty policy-making in the following chapters.
To test the general expectation, I generate a novel measure of exit power that is moti-
vated by theoretical insights from formal bargaining models. It is comparable over time
and across countries and based on the simulation of almost 120,000 potential govern-
ments that could have formed in developed democracies in the postwar era. For each of
these potential governments, I estimate its viability as the probability that they will enter
office. In addition, I calcuate the ideological attractiveness of each potential government
to each of its members. The viability is weighted by the ideological attractiveness to arrive
at each potential government’s expected utility to each of its members. Since bargaining
power is an inherently relative concept, a government party’s exit power is the total ex-
pected utility it can derive from its alternatives relative to the expected utility its partners
can derive from theirs.
In Chapter II, I analyze why some governments spend more than others. Since conces-
sions have spending implications in terms of extending existing policies or implementing
new ones, I expect total government spending to vary systematically with the distribution
of exit power across coalition members. I expect governments to spend more, the more
parties they include only to the extent that the strongest party controls little exit power
and has to grant concessions to remain in power. I find that this proposition is supported
by the empirical evidence. Moreover, the effect is mitigated as its exit power increases.
This shows that existing findings on the common pool resource problem – positing that
spending increases in the number of governing parties – is a special case of multiparty
policy-making that only arises if the strongest party in office has to buy off its partners to
remain in power.
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In Chapter III, I examine how governments allocate total spending across different
spending categories. Once in office, each governing party has the incentive to implement
policies that benefit its constituents in an effort to maximize their re-election chances.
However, not every party has the ability to implement its most preferred policies. I ar-
gue that parties that have great exit power are able to implement their ideal policies and
thus increase spending on their core policy areas relative to all others. I find that the
composition of government spending is most responsive to the interests of parties with
significant exit power. For instance, relative to all other spending categories, spending on
national security increases by more, the more exit power right-wing parties have. Sim-
ilarly, relative to all other categories, environmental spending decreases my more, the
more powerful right-wing government parties are. In my statistical analyses, I take into
account dependencies across categories by estimating all spending areas simultaneously.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I analyze why some coalition parties receive more, and more
important, ministerial portfolios than others. I argue that parties’ exit power rather than
their size or status as agenda-setter influences the number and salience of portfolios it
can extract during coalition negotiations. I address previously unresolved methodolog-
ical issues that arise from the compositional character of the data. Ministerial portfolio
data are compositional, however, their structure is unbalanced and irregular. This is due
to the fact that the number of parties in office, and thus the number of equations to be es-
timated simultaneously, is not constant across observations. I discuss and present results
from two approaches to analyze such data. Results suggest that there is a positive effect
between exit power and the share of salience-weighted portfolios a party receives.
Taken together, my empirical results show that the distribution of relative exit power
across government parties has a strong effect on policy concessions parties receive, and
thus, the policies coalition governments implement. The results are more mixed with re-
spect to portfolio concessions, suggesting that the threat to exit the government is a more
powerful tool to use once a government is established and has entered office, often having
3
overcome investiture votes in parliament. As governments have overcome these hurdles,
the cost of a government breakdown increases, so parties with great exit power can make
use of their exit threats to a greater extent and extract more policy concessions from their
partners.
My dissertation makes several contributions to research on multiparty policy-making,
intra-governmental politics, and government formation. The first contribution is theoret-
ical, as I introduce the concept of exit power as the crucial determinant of a party’s ability
to gain bargaining leverage over its coalition partners. Second, I develop a novel measure
of exit power that is theoretically motivated and comparable across space and over time.
This measure is based on the simulation of around 120,000 alternative governments and
the estimation of their political viability and ideological appeal. I generate this measure
for all parties in developed democracies that entered government at least once during the
postwar era. Finally, my research resolves an outstanding puzzle in the literature on com-
parative politics – why do some junior coalition partners extract vastly more concessions
than others? It also contributes to several related literatures on inter-party bargaining,
government spending, and ministerial portfolio allocation. In addition, my research has
wide-ranging implications for different research areas, such as differences in the effective
democratic representation of minorities, differences in the extent of a country’s engage-




Keep Me If You Can: Exit Power and Government Spending
2.1 Introduction
Why are some junior coalition members able to extract significantly greater conces-
sions from their partners than others? Generally, coalitions contain one senior partner
controlling a plurality of government seats and at least one junior member controlling
the remainder. However, some junior partners exert significant influence on government
policy, including spending, while others hold relatively little sway. As junior coalition
members, the German Liberals (FDP) and the Danish Conservative People’s Party are
often able to extract significant concessions from their partners. Their ability to do so,
however, varies over time. Other junior coalition parties that control a similar number of
seats, such as Green parties, on the other hand, are consistently unable to extract signifi-
cant concessions. What, then, can explain the great variation in junior coalition members’
ability to extract concessions from their partners?
I argue that a junior partner’s ability to receive concessions is determined by the credi-
bility of its exit threat. Parties can threaten to exit the incumbent government if they have
at least one alternative government that they can enter. Such threats, however, are only
credible if these alternatives are both viable and ideologically attractive. Consequently,
junior parties that have outside options of high utility can credibly threaten to exit the
incumbent government and so have great Exit Power. The greater their exit power, the
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more concessions junior coalition parties can extract from their partners.
Concessions granted to junior coalition partners are reflected in overall government
expenditures as greater spending on policies or lower revenues due to tax cuts. More-
over, spending questions loom large during negotiations before governments enter office
and continue to be contentious and potentially disruptive during the legislative term.
Hence, I expect that government spending varies systematically with the distribution of
exit power across coalition partners. In line with the existing literature, I expect spending
to increase in the number of governing parties, however, I argue that this relationship is
conditional on the exit power of the strongest coalition party. As its share of exit power
increases, I expect this effect to be mitigated.
I develop a new, theoretically motivated and computationally complex measure of
relative exit power and use it to test this proposition. This measure calculates how likely
each potential government is to form and how attractive it is to each of its potential
members. It is comparable across countries and over time, and is constructed for every
government party in developed democracies during the post-war era. I test my expecta-
tions using data on government spending for developed democracies between 1970 and
2012. The empirical analysis shows that spending only increases in the number of gov-
erning parties if the strongest party controls little exit power. This effect is mitigated as
exit power becomes more concentrated in the strongest party.
This paper makes three important contributions. First, I conceptualize parties’ bar-
gaining power as deriving from their credible exit threats rather than their size (Crombez
1996; Gamson 1961; Riker 1962), ideological centrality (Laver & Shepsle 1996; Sartori
1976), or government office itself (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013;
Tsebelis 2002). Second, I develop a new measure of relative exit power that captures the
expected utility of government parties’ outside options. Finally, I demonstrate that dif-
ferences in government spending can be explained by the extent to which exit power is
concentrated in the hands of one government party. I find that spending only increases in
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the number of governing parties to the extent that the strongest party controls relatively
little exit power. As the strongest party holds greater exit power, this effect is mitigated.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section, I describe
alternative explanations for parties’ different abilities to extract concessions. Next, I in-
troduce the argument that exit power derives from the credibility of parties’ exit threats
and explain how this influences policy-making. I apply this argument to government
spending and derive a testable proposition connecting exit power with patterns of over-
all spending. In the next section, I explain my new measure of relative exit power before
discussing the results of the empirical analysis. In the last section, I will provide a sum-
mary and discuss further implications that arise from the broader theoretical argument.
2.2 Gaps in the Existing Literature
Extant accounts of government formation and multiparty policy-making cannot ex-
plain the variation in junior parties’ ability to secure concessions. Five propositions con-
cerning the power of coalition parties arise from the existing literature, four of which can
be applied to junior partners. I will briefly review each in this section.
First, a significant number of studies on multiparty policy-making argue that all gov-
ernment parties, irrespective of their size or ideological position, are equally powerful
(Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013; Persson, Roland, & Tabellini 2007;
Tsebelis 2002). Tsebelis, for instance, argues that the status quo is harder to change, the
more veto players need to agree to such a change and the farther away they are located
from each other in the ideological space (Tsebelis 2002). Similarly, studies on government
expenditures assume that all parties are able to extract additional spending. Govern-
ment spending is, thus, argued to increase in the number of government parties because
each party represents a different constituency for which it seeks to increase spending.
Single-party governments are, therefore, expected to spend less than coalition govern-
7
ments, and spending is argued to increase in the number of coalition parties (Bawn &
Rosenbluth 2006; Persson et al. 2007). Recent research has emphasized the importance
of insitutional differences, arguing that government spending tends to be lower if bud-
getary constraints are high (Martin & Vanberg 2013) or if the Finance Minister has the
ability to monitor and, if need be, punish spending ministers (Hallerberg, Strauch, & von
Hagen 2007; Hallerberg & von Hagen 1997). These arguments, however, still assume that
all government parties can extract spending as long as they are in government. Whether
or not they are in fact successful depends only on the institutional context.
The second proposition posits that junior coalition members can extract more con-
cessions, the more seats they control. The best known argument along these lines is
Gamson’s stating that parties receive a share of concessions, in this case ministerial posts,
that is proportional to the share of seats they contribute to the government’s majority
(Gamson 1961). Studies on multiparty policy-making, therefore, tend to use the gov-
ernment’s center of gravity to analyze the effect of government parties, particularly their
ideological positions, on policies. This measure calculates the mean ideological posi-
tion of all governing parties, wheighting each party’s individual position by its share of
government seats or portfolios (Boix 1998; Cusack 1999; Franzese 2002, for instance).
Similarly, Morelli finds that parties receive concessions that are proportional to their bar-
gaining power, i.e. voting weights in parliament (Morelli 1999). Note that while voting
weights are not the same as seat shares, empirical work on the allocation of concessions
across coalition members uses their seat shares as a measure of their voting weights (An-
solabehere, James M. Snyder, Strauss, & Ting 2005, for a discussion of the differences).
Another set of studies posits that junior partners receive greater concessions if they
are ideologically central. Sartori argues that one source of parties’ power is their “coali-
tion potential” (Sartori 1976, p. 122). Thus, centrally located parties tend to be powerful
even if they are small because they are needed to form a minimum winning coalition com-
posed of ideologically close parties more often than more extreme parties. “Kingmaker
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parties”, small parliamentary parties located in between two large ones, arise as particu-
larly powerful since they can determine which one of the two larger parties enters gov-
ernment office. Crombez, in contrast, finds that junior coalition members receive greater
side-payments if they are large and centrally located (Crombez 1996). Laver and Shepsle
disaggregate the left-right dimension into individual policy dimensions and argue that
parliamentary parties’ power is only determined by the centrality of their positions on
each individual dimension, irrespective of their size (Laver & Shepsle 1996).
Finally, formal models of government formation acknowledge that parties’ bargain-
ing power differs and can be divided into two categories, non-cooperative and coopera-
tive models. Non-cooperative models, such as Baron and Ferejohn and models follow-
ing their tradition, argue that formateurs receive greater concessions than their coalition
partners since they enjoy an agenda-setting advantage (Baron & Ferejohn 1989). That is,
since agenda-setters draw up the proposal which is presented to other parties, these pro-
posals will contain concessions for the proposal-maker that are greater than its share of
voting weights (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Baron & Ferejohn 1989). Measuring each coali-
tion party’s share of voting weights in parliament rather than their size in seat shares,
Ansolabehere and his co-authors find that the formateur status, indeed, gives parties a
bonus of portfolio concessions (Ansolabehere et al. 2005).
Cooperative models, on the other hand, comprise voting models and arrive at a differ-
ent proposition (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Felsenthal & Machover 1998). The Banzhaf in-
dex (Banzhaf 1965), for istance, measures how often a legislator can change the outcome
of a vote, i.e. “swing” the vote (Leech 2013, emphasis in original). Similarly, the Shapley-
Shubik index (Shapley & Shubik 1954) measures the share of all coalitions for which a
party is pivotal. Applied to the coalition formation context, junior coalition members are
expected to receive more concessions, the more often they are needed to push coalitions
over the parliamentary majority threshold.
While the specifics differ depending on the particular institutional context, all of
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the non-cooperative models follow in the tradition of classic bargaining models (An-
solabehere et al. 2005; Morelli 1999; Rubinstein 1982). At the heart of all bargaining
models, in turn, lies the notion that actors’ next best options in the event of a bar-
gaining breakdown in the current round determine their bargaining power (Nash 1950;
Rubinstein 1982). This crucial component of all bargaining models, however, has not
been properly acknowledged and measured in empirical research on multiparty policy-
making. In the following sections, I will introduce this dynamic to decision-making in
coalitions during the legislative term and explain how I measure parties’ exit power.
2.3 Theoretical Argument: Junior Parties’ Exit Power
Multiparty policy-making and government formation are intricately linked processes.
Once a government has formed, policy-making does not occur in isolation. Rather, decision-
making in the incumbent government takes place in the shadow of other governments
that could form instead. Since multiparty policy-making is an ongoing process of ne-
gotiations among governing parties that does not stop after a coalition government is
formed, government parties’ strategic positions in the government formation game de-
termine their bargaining power not only during coalition negotiations but also in the
policy-making game. As such, junior coalition members are able to extract significant
policy concessions if they have great exit power.
All such concessions have spending implications, such as increased spending on new
or existing policies or reduced revenues due to tax cuts, which in turn put pressure
on spending. Questions surrounding government spending figure prominently during
coalition negotiations and during the government’s tenure in office. Conflict surround-
ing spending, and particularly spending cuts, can be so contentious that it leads to the
breakdown of the government. As such, government spending in particular is subject to
continued bargaining between all coalition members from the beginning of their tenure
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to the very end. Therefore, I expect government spending to vary systematically with
junior coalition members’ ability to extract concessions.
Agreement on how much the incoming coalition government is willing to spend in
the legislative term is important to reaching a coalition agreement. In Germany, gov-
ernment spending was highlighted as a crucial part to the coalition agreements parties
reached after the general elections in 2005 and 2013 (Tempest November 11, 2005; Zeit
Online October 24, 2013). Similarly, after the 2010 general elections in Great Britain,
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats came to a coalition agreement when, among
other things, the Liberal Democrats accepted immediate spending cuts (Wintour May 11,
2010). On the other hand, failure to agree on spending issues often leads to the break-
down of coalition negotiations. After the 2000 general elections in Austria, the outgoing
SPÖ Finance Minister attributed the breakdown of the negotiations between the SPÖ and
ÖVP to the fact that the ÖVP could not be trusted with taxpayers’ money (Rohrer Decem-
ber 12, 2013). Similarly, negotiations between the Liberal Democrats and Labour in Great
Britain in 2010 came to a halt due to disagreements over how to finance certain policies
(Wintour May 11, 2010).
Once a government has taken office, disagreements over spending issues, especially
spending cuts, can cause great tension and ultimately cause the government to break. In
2012, the Dutch government resigned and called for early elections when the coalition’s
parliamentary support party abandoned negotiations over spending cuts (Waterfeld April
23, 2012). As these brief examples illustrate, government spending looms large over the
entire life cycle of a coalition government. But how exactly is spending driven by inter-
party bargaining, and how does such bargaining affect variation in spending? I argue
that junior coalition members’ exit power and, thus, their ability to extract concessions
explains variation in overall government spending.
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2.3.1 The Source of Exit Power: Parties’ Outside Options
In line with classic bargaining models, I argue that junior and senior coalition par-
ties’ bargaining power is determined by the options available to them in the event of a
bargaining breakdown. In addition, I argue that these outside options do not cease to
determine parties’ bargaining power once they enter office. That is, I posit that coalition
parties’ exit power, and thus their ability to extract concessions, is determined by how
credibly they can threaten to exit the incumbent government. The credibility of a gov-
ernment party’s exit threat, in turn, is determined by the expected utility of its outside
options. I define an outside option as an alternative government a governing party can
enter. The expected utility of an outside option stems from this potential government’s
viability and attractiveness to its potential members. While viability is a characteristic
of the potential government itself and does not differ across its members, the potential
government’s attractiveness does.
Potential governments are more viable as outside options, the more likely they are
to form. A large body of research on government formation has found that numerical
and ideological factors affect how likely different government types are to form (Laver &
Schofield 1990; Martin & Stevenson 2001, for an overview). If no single parliamentary
party controls a majority of parliamentary seats, a coalition government containing the
smallest number of parties to cross the majority threshold (minimum winning coalition)
is expected to form (Riker 1962).
Accounting for policy considerations, minimum connected winning coalitions – that
is, minimum winning coalitions comprised of ideologically adjacent parties – are more
likely to form than others (Axelrod 1970). This is the case because coalition partners
can reach compromise more easily if they are adjacent to one another on a single policy
dimension. Refining this proposition further, DeSwaan posits that minimum winning
coalitions exhibiting the smallest range of ideological positions are most likely to enter
office (De Swaan 1973). Taken together, coalition governments containing few and ide-
12
ologically close parties are more likely to enter government office than other potential
governments1.
Each government party’s outside options can be ranked according to their formation
likelihood, which is the same for all of its members. However, an alternative government
is not equally attractive to all of its members. Attractiveness differs depending on the dis-
tance between each member’s and the potential government’s ideological position. The
closer an outside option’s ideological position is to one of its members’ own position, the
more attractive it is to this particular party. This is the case because the outside option’s
policies are likely to be close to its own ideological position.
Taken together, a governing party is powerful if it can enter at least one other gov-
ernment that is likely to form and ideologically attractive. As such, government parties’
exit power increases in the expected utility of their outside options. Parties know how
powerful their coalition partners are since the parliamentary bargaining context – the
distribution of parties’ seat shares and ideological positions – is common knowledge.
That is, parties know what other coalitions their coalition partners can enter, if they are
likely to form, and how attractive they are to them.
2.3.2 Policy-Making Under Exit Threats
There are benefits and costs associated with inviting a certain junior party into a coali-
tion. The existing literature has focused on the benefits junior parties confer to the for-
mateur by contributing a certain number of seats or a more moderate ideological position
to the coalition. Formateurs, however, also incur costs by including certain junior parties
1Minority and surplus governments, however, make up a significant number of governments during
the post-World War II era, one third and one fourth, respectively (Crombez 1996; Strøm 1984; Volden &
Carrubba 2004). Minority governments are more likely to form under certain institutional settings (Strøm
1984), and the more fragmented and polarized the opposition is (Martin & Stevenson 2001). Surplus gov-
ernments can arise in times of crises (Baron & Diermeier 2001), if the formateur is small and not centrally
located (Crombez 1996), if legislative logrolls are not sustainable (Carrubba & Volden 2000), or if a different
majority in the upper chamber is needed to pass legislation (Lijphart 1984).
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in a coalition government, both during the formation process and the ongoing bargaining
process once in office. I argue that the extent to which junior parties can extract conces-
sions is determined by how credibly they can threaten to exit the incumbent government
and, thereby, by how costly it is to keep them in office. This logic is not exclusive to junior
coalition members, however, as it applies to senior coalition members as well. Irrespec-
tive of its size in seats, any governing party – junior or senior partner – that can credibly
threaten to exit the incumbent government can extract vast concessions from its coalition
partners.
Bargaining power, however, is an inherently relative concept, so the extent to which
parties can extract concessions depends on their exit power relative to that of their coali-
tion partners. A governing party that has outside options of great expected utility can
only extract concessions from its coalition partners if these lack such outside options,
that is, parties’ willingness to grant concessions decreases with their exit power. Govern-
ing parties that have no other viable or attractive alternative governments that they can
enter are willing to make concessions to remain in office. Therefore, governing parties’
relative bargaining power directly affects multiparty policy-making.
Junior coalition members, and governing parties in general, can control no to all rel-
ative exit power in a government. First consider a case where a junior party does not
control any exit power relative to its coalition partners. While such a party can demand
concessions, its partners will not grant them any. Since such a junior party has no other
viable or attractive outside options that it can enter, its threats to exit the incumbent gov-
ernment are not credible. Therefore, junior coalition members that control no relative
exit power cannot extract concessions. As junior coalition members’ share of exit power
increases, however, so does their ability to extract concessions from their partners.
If junior and senior partners have equal exit power, all parties are able to extract con-
cessions. In such a case, none of the governing parties has a bargaining advantage. More-
over, all governing parties can enter alternative governments that are both viable and
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attractive, so they can all credibly threaten to exit the incumbent government. Conse-
quently, it is unclear a priori which party can remain in office in the event the incumbent
government breaks. As such, junior members are able to extract some concessions from
their partners even if they control only a small share of government seats. Therefore, in
such a case, both senior and junior partners make concessions to each other to remain in
office, and both affect government policies equally.
Finally, junior partners can be the party dominating a coalition government as well.
In this case, they control all exit power because only they can credibly threaten to exit the
incumbent government. Therefore, such a highly powerful junior party is the only gov-
ernment actor able to extract concessions. In sum, junior coalition members can extract
greater concessions from their partners, the more relative exit power they control.
Hypothesis. A junior coalition member’s ability to extract concessions from its partners in-
creases in its relative exit power.
The question remains, however, why a formateur would invite powerful junior part-
ners into government if those could bring down the coalition by entering one of their
outside options before the next general elections. The best case scenario for the forma-
teur is not having to grant any concessions to its coalition partners. This is possible if the
formateur itself is powerful and has many equally attractive governments to choose from.
In such a case, it prefers to enter into a coalition with weak partners only. At the other
extreme, the formateur clearly prefers having a powerful junior partner to the worst case
scenario of suspending coalition negotiations and conferring the formateur status to the
next largest party.
When inviting powerful junior parties into government, the formateur has to grant
them concessions. At the same time, however, the formateur itself is still able to secure
concessions as well. Moreover, once a bargain is struck, it is one that is desirable to all
15
actors involved. If presented with the choice between two equally attractive potential
junior partners which only differ in their exit power, the formateur will choose to form
a government with the weaker party. If they differ in attractiveness as well, however,
the formateur will enter office with the more powerful party if it is significantly more
attractive than the weaker one. Moreover, entering office with one powerful party is pre-
ferred to entering government with several parties that, combined, have great exit power
as well. With increasing transaction costs, the marginal cost of adding one powerful ju-
nior partner to the coalition is smaller than adding several weaker ones.
Powerful junior partners, on the other hand, enter a coalition because they prefer it to
not entering government at all. Junior partners depend on being invited into government
by the formateur, so not entering a proposed coalition always bears the risk of foregoing
government office entirely. Powerful junior coalition members can only exert their power
and extract concessions if they are in government. Kingmaker parties arise as a special
case of this dynamic. If such party a exists, this small party is located in between two
large parties. For each of the large parties, the kingmaker is the only option to avoid
entering office with the other large one. Therefore, in such a case, the formateur simply
does not have any options other than inviting a kingmaker party into the government,
which can have great bargaining power even if it controls only a small number of seats.
2.3.3 Exit Power and Variation in Government Spending
The general hypothesis derived above that junior coalition members’ ability to extract
concessions increases in their relative exit power can be tested using government spend-
ing. As mentioned above, concessions that are granted to coalition members, such as
increased spending on policies, are reflected in overall spending. Moreover, spending
questions loom large during the entire life cycle of a coalition government, with failure to
agree often leading to the collapse of coalition negotiations or the government itself. As
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such, I expect government spending to vary depending on the distribution of exit power
across coalition parties.
Extant studies on the determinants of government spending assume that all govern-
ing parties are able to extract spending for their constitutents. This line of research can
be traced back to Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen’s “Law of 1/n”, which holds that the
size of policies increases in the number of districts, and thus, the size of parliament
(Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen 1981, p. 654). Applied to parliamentary systems, ex-
tant research suggests that government spending increases in the number of government
parties (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013; Persson et al. 2007). Each
party in government caters to a different group of voters and seeks to implement poli-
cies that reward these constituents in order to maximize the probability of receiving their
votes again and being re-elected in the next election. Since such policies necessarily cost
money, overall government spending is expected to increase in the number of different
constituencies represented in government, and therefore, the number of parties in office.
Thus, single-party governments are expected to spend less than coalition governments
in general, while coalitions are expected to spend more, the more parties they comprise
(Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013; Persson et al. 2007).
However, coalition governments also vary in their spending patterns. Coalitions ex-
hibit higher levels of debt and deficit, for instance, the more fractionalized and polarized
they are (Franzese 2002). In addition, recent research finds that the effect of the num-
ber of government parties on overall spending is conditional on the institutional context.
Where the institutional strength of the Finance Minister is great (Hallerberg et al. 2007;
Hallerberg & von Hagen 1997) or the level of budgetary constraints is high (Martin &
Vanberg 2013), overall spending, indeed, does not increase in the number of government
parties. Accounting for the international political environment, Clark and Hallerberg
also find that the raw number of government parties does not have a significant effect on
government debt (Clark & Hallerberg 2000). These accounts, however, still assume all
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governing parties to be equally able to extract spending. Parties’ ability to do so does not
differ across them but is constrained by the institutional context in which they operate.
In contrast, I argue that governing parties differ greatly with respect to their bargaining
power and, thus, their ability to extract concessions from their government partners. I
expect government spending to reflect the extent to which exit power is concentrated in
one governing party.
As explained above, all governing parties can control no to all exit power in a coali-
tion government. If one party, whether a junior or senior coalition member, concentrates
all exit power in its hands, only this party can extract concessions and affect spending.
Adding more parties to the government will not increase spending since these weak coali-
tion members are not able to credibly threaten to exit the government, and thus, cannot
extract any concessions. The strongest party, on the other hand, controls all exit power,
so it does not have to grant concessions to its coalition partners. Therefore, in contrast
to the existing literature on government spending, I do not expect spending to increase
in the number of governing parties to the extent that exit power is concentrated in one
party.
The less power the strongest party controls, however, the more concessions its coali-
tion partners can extract. If the strongest party in office controls little exit power, it has
to make concessions to its partners to remain in government. In such a case, I expect an
additional government party to increase spending. Therefore, I argue that spending in-
creases in the number of governing parties in a subset of cases where the strongest party
controls little exit power relative to its coalition partners.
Proposition. Government spending only increases in the number of parties to the extent that
the strongest party controls little exit power.
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2.4 Data and Method
In this section, I first explain how I measure governing parties’ relative exit power.
Next, I describe the data that I use to test the proposition derived above that government
spending only increases in the number of parties to the extent that the strongest party
controls little exit power. Lastly, I describe the method and sample I use in my empirical
analysis.
2.4.1 Measuring Exit Power
In contrast to existing empirical research on multiparty policy-making, I develop a
new, theoretically driven and computationally complex measure of governing parties’
exit power that is comparable cross-nationally and over time. The Technical Appendix
provides a more detailed description of the generation of this new measure as well as
a discussion of how it differs from other measures of bargaining power. This measure
captures each governing party’s next best option in case bargaining in the incumbent
government breaks down, which is the crucial component of bargaining models of any
kind (Nash 1950; Rubinstein 1982). I construct this measure for all government parties
in developed democracies for the entire post-war era2. To capture the formation likeli-
hood and attractiveness of each party’s outside options, I use data on each parliamentary
party’s number of seats(Döring & Manow 2012; EJPR 1974–2011; Mackie & Rose 1991;
Nordsieck 1997–2016), their ideological position on the general left-right scale(Budge,
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & (eds.) 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & Mc-
Donald 2006; Volkens et al. 2013), and the partisan composition of governments(EJPR
1974–2011; Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge 2000). For the construction of the new exit
power measure, the unit of analysis is each government formation process. Parliamen-
tary parties enter a new government formation process after each general election or if
2My sample includes Western and Eastern Europe as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
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the partisan composition of the government changes in between elections.
To measure exit power, I generate all 2n−1 potential governments that can form from
any n-party parliament. That is, I generate all governments containing one, two, three,
etc. parties that can form up to the one including all parliamentary parties. I do this for
all government formation processes in all developed democracies during the post-war era
where more than two and up to twelve political parties entered parliament3. I generate
the relative exit power measure for all parties that were in office in developed democra-
cies between the first democratic election after the Second World War and 20124. The
data set from which I generate this measure contains almost 120,000 potential govern-
ments.
The expected utility of outside options is determined by their formation likelihood
and ideological attractiveness to each of their potential members. I estimate each poten-
tial government’s formation likelihood following Martin and Stevenson’s approach (Mar-
tin & Stevenson 2001), however, I extend the time period covered to 2012 and the sample
of countries covered to include Central and Eastern European countries after democrati-
zation. Moreover, I include all potential governments in the sample, not excluding any
minority or surplus governments, even including the government comprising all parlia-
mentary parties. Following Martin and Stevenson, I estimate a conditional logit model
regressing a dummy variable of whether or not the government in fact formed after the
formation process on a number of explanatory variables that have been found to affect
the likelihood of a government entering office (Martin & Stevenson 2001).
These variables are based on the findings of the government formation literature and
include characteristics of the governments’ size and ideological composition (see the dis-
3I choose the cutoff of twelve parties as the computation becomes too challenging from thirteen parties
onward. Moreover, between 1945 and 2012, only one government formation process (Italy after the 2006
general elections) saw thirteen parliamentary parties compete to enter government. In addition, the ide-
ological position of the parties in government is the same in the CMP data, hence, for these two reasons,
I drop the government parties that entered office after the general election of 2006 (Budge et al. 2001;
Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013)
4For the Eastern European countries in my sample, I calculate each governing party’s relative exit power
starting with the second democratic election after democratization.
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cussion in section 3.1). I expect a potential government to be more likely to enter office if
it is a single-party majority government; if it crosses the parliamentary majority thresh-
old; if it is a minimum winning coalition; and if government parties are adjacent to each
other on the ideological dimension (see Table 1). In contrast, I expect governments to
be less likely to form if they are surplus governments, including parties not needed to
cross the majority threshold, and if the two most extreme parties in the government are
located far away from each other on the ideological scale. This is because compromise
is harder to reach, the more actors are involved in the decision-making process, and the
farther apart they are from each other ideologically. The results of the conditional logit
estimation support these expectations. For all potential governments that can form, I
generate the predicted values from this estimation and use them as the measure of these
potential governments’ fomation likelihood. This measure is constrained between zero
and one and constant for each potential government member.
Table 2.1: Outside Option Formation Likelihood
Variable Effect on Formation Likelihood
Single-Party Majority Government +
Majority Government +
Minimum Winning Coalition +
Ideologically Connected Government +
Surplus Coalition −
Ideological Range −
For the attractiveness of each potential government, I calculate the distance between
each government party’s ideological position and the potential government’s position. I
use each potential government’s center of gravity as the measure of its ideological posi-
tion, that is, I generate the seat share-weighted average ideological position of its mem-
bers. Since a government’s attractiveness decreases in this distance, I re-scale the mea-
sure, restrict it to positive values for ease of interpretation, and take the square root of
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it5.
Finally, I calculate the expected utility of each outside option for each of its member
parties by multiplying its formation likelihood by its party-specific attractiveness. To
generate each government party’s exit power, I sum the expected utilities of all outside
options that a government party can enter, excluding the government that in fact formed
after each government formation process. Since I argue that a party’s relative exit power
determines its ability to extract concessions, I calculate the share of exit power each gov-
ernment party controls. For this, I divide each governing party’s exit power by the sum
of all governing parties’ exit power.
This new measure of governing parties’ exit power differs from existing measures of
parties’ bargaining power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley & Shubik 1954),
that restrict the set of potential governments that are considered. The Shapley-Shubik
index, for instance, only considers minimum winning coalitions. However, since minor-
ity and surplus governments make up one third and one fourth, respectively, of all gov-
ernments formed in the post-war era, I do not exclude any potential government a priori
to capture the fullest and most realistic set of options that parties face while bargaining
(Crombez 1996; Strøm 1984; Volden & Carrubba 2004). Moreover, potential governments
whose likelihood of entering office is miniscule, such as a single-party minority govern-
ment of small parties, do not contribute to these parties’ exit power greatly because their
formation likelihood is small, even if they are highly attractive.
5I do this by multiplying the measure by (−1) and adding the observed maximum disutility in each
country. Compared to other measures of parties’ policy positions, such as expert surveys, the CMP data
exhibit more and greater changes in parties’ ideological positions. Moreover, such changes often involve
parties leapfrogging over others. This suggests that changes tend to be over-estimated, so I use the square
root to transform the attractiveness measure.
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2.4.2 Data and Research Design
I now turn to describing the data and method used to test the proposition that spend-
ing only increases in the number of government parties to the extent that the strongest
party holds little exit power. I test this proposition by interacting the Number of Parties
(weighted by the share of days in office) with the share of exit power the strongest party
controls (Exit Power Strongest Party). The average number of parties in the sample is 2.7,
with a minimum of just over 1, for cases where single-party governments are in office for
the vast majority of the year, and a maximum of six (see Table 2). Theoretically, the share
of exit power the strongest party controls ranges from zero to one. Empirically, however,
it ranges from 15 to 98 percent of all exit power, with a mean of just over half of exit
power at 53 percent.
Since I expect spending to increase in the number of government parties only to the
extent that the strongest party holds relatively little exit power, I expect the coefficient of
the Number of Parties to be positive. However, as I argue that this dynamic is mitigated by
high levels of exit power concentration in one party, I expect the interaction term (Num-
ber of Parties × Strongest) to have a negative effect on government spending.
The dependent variable in the following analyses, Government Spending, is measured
as the government’s total disbursements as a share of GDP (Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel,
Weisstanner, & Engler 2015) and ranges from a quarter of GDP to just over 70 percent
of GDP with a mean of 46 percent. I include a number of control variables that are in
line with previous studies on the determinants of government spending. I control for the
Unemployment Rate, the share of the Dependent Population (younger than 15 or older than
65) (OECD 2015), GDP per capita in thousand 2010 US Dollars (OECD 2016), and capital
accounts Openness (Armingeon et al. 2015). The unemployment rate ranges from 0.3 to
almost 20 percent, with a mean of just below seven percent. GDP per capita is measured
in thousands of 2010 US Dollars and has a mean value of $29,470. The minimum lies
at just below $11,000, while the maximum lies at over $61,000. On average around one
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third of the population is classified as dependent, ranging from almost 29 percent to just
over 42 percent. Finally, capital account openness has a mean value of 0.74 and ranges
from zero to one.
Moreover, I also include the government’s ideological position as a control. In con-
trast to extant research, I generate the government’s Exit Power Ideology to measure the
government’s overall position on the left-right dimension. Instead of weighting each gov-
erning party’s ideological position by its share of government seats, I use its share of exit
power as the weight. Greater values of this measure mean that governments are located
farther to the right of the general left-right dimension, that is, exit power is concentrated
in right-wing parties. I expect governments to spend less if exit power is concentrated
in right-wing parties and to spend more if exit power is concentrated in left-wing par-
ties. Left-of-center parties prefer greater levels of spending and redistribution since their
core constituents are more likely to be hurt by unemployment, for instance (Hibbs 1987).
Right-of-center parties, on the other hand, prefer to decrease government spending or to
keep it at its status quo (Hibbs 1987). The average ideological position of governments
(Exit Power Ideology) lies slightly to the left of the left-right dimension at -0.46 and ranges
from -36.25 to 60.90.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Government Spending (% GDP) 46.66 7.46 25.55 70.207 527
Number of Parties 2.70 1.05 1.06 6 527
Exit Power Strongest Party 0.53 0.20 0.15 0.98 527
Exit Power Ideology -0.46 15.40 -36.25 60.90 527
Unemployment Rate 6.92 3.70 0.3 19.9 527
GDP per capita 29.47 9.62 10.95 61.42 527
Dependent Population 33.79 2.32 28.69 42.08 527
Openness 0.74 0.31 0 1 527
In line with previous research, all political variables enter the estimation as their first
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lag. This is due to the fact that the budget at time t is decided and passed at t − 1. I
include all economic controls as lagged as well as contemporaneous variables. Economic
conditions at t − 1 influence the decision-making process, and economic conditions at
t affect automatic responses in spending. The results are robust to a number of differ-
ent specifications of the control variables, such as changes and lags only. I use panel-
corrected standard errors to address heteroskedasticity (Beck & Katz 1995) and include
the lagged dependent variable to account for serially correlated errors (Beck 2001; Beck &
Katz 1996), both standard in this literature (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg
2013). In the next section, I present results both with and without country-fixed effects.
My argument about intra-governmental dynamics of policy-making hinges on inter-
party bargaining in government, so I restrict my sample to multiparty governments. With
only one party in government in single-party governments, the crucial bargaining takes
place within the government party rather than between coalition members. Thus, since
the dynamic of interest is absent in these cases, I only include coalition governments in
the main empirical analyses. Given data availability of the economic variables, my final
data set includes coalition governments in developed democracies6 between 1970 and
2012.
2.5 Results
In this section, I present results from empirical analyses testing the proposition that
government spending only increases in the number of parties to the extent that the
strongest party controls little exit power. First, I discuss how parties’ relative exit power
and government seat shares compare and how strong and large Prime Ministers’ parties
ares. Next, I present some bivariate relationship between spending across governments
6These include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, and Sweden.
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and the number of government parties and the strongest party’s bargaining power. Fi-
nally, I will discuss results on the determinants of government spending in coalition gov-
ernments.
2.5.1 Exit Power, Seat Shares, and Prime Ministers
Before I turn to discussing variation in government spending and results of the anal-
ysis of government spending, I focus on a comparison of parties’ exit power and their
size in government seats. Figure 1 plots each governing party’s share of government seats
against its share of total exit power. It also highlights cases located along the off-diagonal
– parties that control a small share of government seats but great relative exit power or
vice versa. Regressing parties’ seat shares on their exit power, exit power has a coefficient
of 0.97, and the intercept falls at 0.01.
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I generate the new exit power measure for a total of 1,174 government parties in de-
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veloped democracies during the postwar era. Of those, 404 parties are simultaneously
the strongest and largest party in government. While this includes all 178 single-party
governments in the sample, this number also contains 115 such parties in two-party gov-
ernments, 54 in three-party governments, 42 in four-party governments, 13 in five-party
governments, and two in six-party governments. Thus, exit power is not solely measur-
ing junior coalition parties’ bargaining power but also captures those cases where a large
party can substitute its smaller coalition partners and still remain in office. One example
is the Italian DC which regularly entered office with a number of smaller coalition part-
ners that it could easily replace. In contrast, in 73 cases the smallest party is the most
powerful coalition partner, with the majority of these cases, 52, occurring in two-party
governments. Examples include classic kingmaker parties like the German FDP as well
as the Labour Party in Ireland and Social Democrats in the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
117 coalition parties (in addition to all single-party governments) control more than
half of the government’s seats and also score more than 0.5 in exit power. Further divid-
ing both exit power and seat shares into quintiles, I can compare how often parties fall
into the same quintiles in both measures. Only 187 parties in governments, including all
178 single-party governments, fall into the highest quintile for both measures. 22 gov-
ernment parties fall into both fourth quintiles, 70 into both third quintiles, 183 into both
second quintiles, and 100 fall into the first quintile of both exit power and seat shares.
Of the 1,174 total parties in government, 448 control the Prime Minister’s post. More-
over, of all parties in the sample, 516 control most exit power. Of these most powerful
parties, 318 also hold the Prime Minister’s postition. Similarly, 526 of 1,174 parties are
the largest party in office, and of these, 404 also control the Prime Ministership. Of the
404 parties that are the most powerful and the largest in office, 318 are also the Prime
Minister’s party. Thus, the majority of parties that dominate government in terms of
either exit power, seat share, or both also control the Prime Minister’s post. In coali-
tion governments, the Prime Minister’s party’s relative share of exit power lies at 0.43 on
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average, ranging from a minimum of 0.03 to a maximum of 0.98. Similarly, the Prime
Minister’s party controls an average of 59 percent of government seats, ranging from a
low of four percent to a high of 98 percent.
I now turn to illustrating the difference between parties’ exit power and government
seat shares by highlighting a few cases. For ease of interpretation, I consider two-party
coalitions that illustrate the relationship between the strongest party’s exit power and
policy concessions granted to its partner. Some small junior coalition members are able
to extract significantly greater concessions from their partners than others. As mentioned
above, classic kingmaker parties can fall into the category of small but very powerful gov-
erning parties, however, this is not automatically the case. Moreover, kingmaker parties
are not the only parties in this category. While these parties’ share of government seats
cannot explain their ability to extract concessions, the credibility of their exit threats can.
An example of a classic kingmaker party that is often able to extract great concessions
is the German FDP. In the two governments in office between 1987 and 1994 (1987 to
1990 and 1990 to 1994), the FDP controlled 17 and 20 percent of the governments seats,
respectively, and held slightly more than one third of relative exit power (0.36 and 0.34,
respectively). Its coalition partner, the Christian Democrats (CDU), thus, controlled just
under two thirds of exit power. Government spending between 1988 and 1995 generally
ranged from 43 to 48 percent of GDP7. In the succeeding government, the FDP was again
in office with the CDU and controlled 14 percent of seats but 60 percent of the govern-
ment’s exit power. Thus, in this coalition, the FDP was the strongest party but held less
exit power than the CDU in the preceding legislative term. Between 1995 and 1999, gov-
ernment spending increased to range from 48 to 49 percent of GDP. This brief example
lends some initial support to the proposition derived above, and also illustrates that king-
maker parties do not automatically have greater exit power than their larger partners.
Denmark’s Conservative People’s Party (KF) is another example of a junior party that
7Spending in 1995 was an usually high outlier at 54 percent of GDP.
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can sometimes extract concessions from its partners. In contrast to the FDP, the KF’s
ideological position is not consistently central compared to other parliamentary parties,
and it is not a kingmaker party since the parliamentary bargaining context in Denmark is
comprised of up to eleven parliamentary parties. After the general elections in 2005, the
KF entered a coalition government with the Liberals (V) as the junior partner, controlling
just over one quarter of the government’s seats. Its exit power, however, was greater at
almost 0.42. The Liberals, thus, controlled almost three quarters of seats and 0.58 of exit
power. Government spending made up 49.82 percent of GDP in 2006 and 49.58 percent
of GDP in 2007. After the general elections in 2007, both parties remained in office with
similar seat shares but with different exit power. After 2007, the Liberals controlled 72
percent of government seats and 53 percent of exit power, while the Conservative Peo-
ple’s Party controlled 28 percent of seats and 47 percent of exit power. Over the next four
years, government spending increased from 50.52 percent of GDP in 2008 to 58.78 per-
cent of GDP in 2012. Starting in 2009, spending was consistently at around 57 percent of
GDP. In this example, the strongest party in government remained the same, however, its
exit power decreased from one legislative term to the next. At the same time, government
spending as a share of GDP increased from around half of Denmarks GDP to slightly un-
der 60 percent. Thus, as the KF’s exit power increased, it was able to extract concessions,
thereby increasing total government spending.
In addition to parties whose ability (or inability) to extract concessions cannot be ex-
plained by their size in government seat shares, the credibility of governing parties’ exit
threats can also explain parties that control a great (small) share of government seats and
exit power. Examples of small parties that cannot extract concessions from their coali-
tion partners are Green parties. These are generally located farther to the left of the
ideological dimension than their coalition partners and hold few seats, so they cannot
credibly threaten to exit governments. Government spending in Finland in the late 1990s
and early 2000s varies between 47 and 51 percent of GDP, irrespective of whether or not
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Green parties are in office, for instance. Similarly, large parties that enter office with a
number of smaller parties, such as the Italian DC, are in a bargaining advantage relative
to their smaller coalition partners. In these cases, parties controlling many government
seats also hold great relative exit power.
2.5.2 Variation in Government Spending
In this section, I will briefly discuss the bivariate relationship between the number
of government parties and spending as well as the relationship between the strongest
party’s exit power and spending. The left panel of Figure 2 plots government spending
against the number of government parties for all coalitions in my sample, while the right
panel restricts the sample to Western European countries. In both panels, government
spending increases from just over 40 percent of GDP for governments with slightly over
one party in government8 to almost 50 percent of GDP for six-party governments. The
relationship is the same regardless of which sample of observations is used. This lends
some initial support to arguments positing that each government party can extract addi-
tional spending.
However, the figure also shows that the variation in the level of spending differs
greatly across coalitions of different size. Government spending as a share of GDP ex-
hibits the smallest variation for five- and six-party governments, with spending ranging
from just below 50 percent to just over 60 percent of GDP. Coalitions containing two to
four parties, on the other hand exhibit greater variation. For two-party governments,
total spending ranges from around 25 percent of GDP to almost 70 percent. In three-
and four-party governments, spending ranges from just over 30 percent to 60 percent
and from just below 40 percent to over 70 percent of GDP. This clearly shows that not all
8These values are due to the fact that I weight the number of parties by days in office. The number of
parties can be at just over one if a single-party government is in office for most of the year and is followed
or preceded by a coalition government.
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coalitions of the same size behave similarly in terms of total government spending.
Figure 2.2: Government Spending and the Number of Government Parties
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Figure 3 plots government spending against the relative exit power the strongest party
controls. As before, the left panel plots this relationship for the full sample of coalition
governments, while the right sample restricts it to Western European coalitions. The
strongest party’s exit power has a negative effect on government spending. Total govern-
ment spending lies at just under 50 percent of GDP at the minimum of exit power and
decreases to just over 40 percent of GDP for governments in which one party concentrates
almost all exit power in its hands. The decrease is slightly smaller for Western European
coalitions. This lends some initial support to my expectation that the strongest party only
has to hand out additional spending to its coalition partners if it controls little exit power.
However, as in the preceding figure, the variation in spending is big. While the pattern
is not as strong as in the previous figure, the variation in total government spending is
smallest at the two extremes of exit power and largest at intermediate levels.
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Figure 2.3: Government Spending and Exit Power of the Strongest Party
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This again shows that not all governments containing the same number of parties nor
those characterized by the same distribution of relative exit power exhibit the same pat-
tern in government expenditures. Therefore, in the next section, I analyze the effect of the
interaction between the strongest party’s share of exit power and the number of parties
in government.
2.5.3 The Effect of Exit Power Concentration on Spending
In this section, I present results of an analysis of the determinants of government
spending. I find support for the proposition derived above that government spending
only increases in the number of governing parties to the extent that the strongest party
controls little exit power. As exit power becomes more concentrated in the strongest
party, however, adding another party to the coalition does not increase spending. Columns
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1 and 2 in Table 3 present results for the full sample of coalition governments in de-
veloped democracies between 1970 and 2012. Columns 3 and 4 present results for the
subset of Western European coalition governments. This sample of Western European
countries has been used to test the relationship between the number of governing parties
and spending in state of the art research (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg
2013).
Figure 2.4: Exit Power Concentration and Government Spending
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I test the proposition that spending only increases in the number of governing parties
to the extent that the strongest party controls little relative exit power by including the
number of governing parties, the share of exit power of the strongest party, and the in-
teraction of these two variables in my empirical model. If the strongest party controls no
exit power at all, an additional governing party increases spending by between 0.5 and
up to 0.7 percent of GDP. This effect is statistically significant at least at the five percent
level. However, as the strongest party’s exit power increases, this effect is mitigated. If the
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Exit Power Concentration on Spending
All Coalition Western
Governments Europe
Number of Partiest−1 0.568∗∗ 0.516∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗
(0.223) (0.229) (0.254) (0.259)
Exit Power Strongest Partyt−1 2.571∗ 2.902∗∗ 3.645∗∗ 3.817∗∗
(1.432) (1.433) (1.753) (1.722)
Number of Partiest−1 × Strongestt−1 -1.027 -1.082 -1.007 -0.979
(0.727) (0.733) (0.868) (0.900)
Exit Power Ideologyt−1 -0.0134∗∗ -0.0108 -0.0109∗ -0.0100
(0.00550) (0.00687) (0.00663) (0.00764)
Spendingt−1 0.938∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0334) (0.0240) (0.0375)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.105 -0.104 -0.204 -0.239
(0.113) (0.111) (0.158) (0.154)
Unemployment Rate 0.00695 0.0963 0.115 0.269
(0.116) (0.112) (0.166) (0.165)
GDP per capitat−1 1.411∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗ 1.447∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.173) (0.211) (0.210)
GDP per capita -1.425∗∗∗ -1.471∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗∗ -1.496∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.177) (0.213) (0.215)
Dependent Populationt−1 0.807∗ 0.491 0.720 0.520
(0.474) (0.452) (0.522) (0.505)
Dependent Population -0.830∗ -0.617 -0.767 -0.611
(0.477) (0.445) (0.522) (0.500)
Opennesst−1 3.428∗∗ 4.065∗∗∗ 3.991∗∗ 4.573∗∗∗
(1.405) (1.377) (1.622) (1.598)
Openness -3.065∗∗ -3.387∗∗ -3.367∗∗ -3.620∗∗
(1.449) (1.446) (1.681) (1.660)
Constant 3.789∗ 14.69∗∗∗ 4.806∗ 12.87∗∗∗
(2.158) (4.230) (2.830) (4.352)
R2 0.927 0.933 0.915 0.921
Observations 527 527 418 418
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
strongest party controls more than one fourth (column 2) or one third (columns 1, 3, 4) of
exit power, adding one more party to the government does not lead to greater spending.
Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of an additional governing party on spending. The
left panel shows the marginal effect for the full sample of coalition governments, and
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Table 2.4: Change in Predicted Spending
Exit Power Strongest Party ∆ Number of Parties ∆ Spending (% GDP)
All Coalition Governments
Minimum × Few→Many +1.24∗∗∗
Mean × Few→Many +0.07
Maximum × Few→Many −1.31
Western Europe
Minimum × Few→Many +1.56∗∗∗
Mean × Few→Many +0.48
Maximum × Few→Many −0.94
Note: All control variables held at their means
the right panel shows the marginal effect for the restricted sample of Western European
coalitions.
Let me illustrate this result by discussing the predicted level of spending for gov-
ernments where the strongest power holds little to almost all of exit power. For these
calculations, only the values of the strongest party’s exit power and the number of parties
change, while the remaining control variables are held at their mean. If the strongest
party’s share of exit power is held at its minimum, increasing the number of governing
parties from two to five increases predicted spending by 1.24 percent of GDP from 46.27
to 47.51 percent of GDP for the sample containing all coalition governments (see Table
4). In contrast, at the mean and maximum share of exit power the strongest party con-
trols, increasing the number of parties from two to five increases spending by 0.07 (at
the mean) and decreases spending by 1.31 (at the minimum) percent of GDP. Similarly,
in Western Europe, at the minimum share of exit power the strongest party controls,
increasing the number of governing parties from two to five increases predicted spend-
ing by 1.56 percent of GDP from 47.04 to 48.61 percent of GDP. Again, at the strongest
party’s mean share of exit power, predicted spending increases by 0.48 percent of GDP,
while predicted spending decreases by 0.94 percent of GDP at the maximum share of exit
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power the strongest party controls. Figure 5 depicts these changes graphically.
Figure 2.5: The Number of Parties and Predicted Spending
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These results support the proposition that spending only increases in the number of
governing parties to the extent that the strongest party holds little exit power. Extant
findings on the determinants of government spending, thus, are a special case of these
results. They hold if the strongest party controls relatively little exit power, and, there-
fore, are a subset of the broader dynamics of inter-party bargaining in multiparty govern-
ments.
The effect of the government’s ideological position is similar to extant studies. The
analysis shows that government spending is lower, the farther to the right governments
are located on the left-right dimension. That is, governments spend less, the more exit
power is concentrated in right-wing parties. A one-unit shift of the government’s ideolog-
ical position to the right decreases spending as a share of GDP by 0.01 to 0.013 percent of
GDP. All else equal, shifting the government’s center of gravity to the right by one stan-
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dard deviation (15.40 and 14.93) decreases spending by 0.21 (all coalition governments)
and 0.16 (Western Europe) percent of GDP. This effect reaches statistical significance at
the five percent level in models not including country-fixed effects. The magnitude of
this effect is very similar to the effects found in previous studies (Bawn & Rosenbluth
2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013).
The effects of the remaining control variables are similar to those found in previous
studies as well. The lag of the unemployment rate has a negative, while its contempo-
raneous measure has a positive effect. Neither, however, reaches statistical significance.
The lagged variables of GDP per capita, the share of the dependent population, and open-
ness all have positive, and the contemporaneous variables have negative effects. GDP per
capita and openness are statistically significant at least at the five percent level.
These results are robust to a number of different model specifications (see Appendix
1 for a discussion and results). Extending the leading studies on the relationship between
the number of government parties and spending, Bawn and Rosenbluth and Martin and
Vanberg’s studies (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006; Martin & Vanberg 2013), to account for the
strongest party’s share of exit power supports the proposition as well. Moreover, includ-
ing additional control variables, accounting for an AR(1) process, changing the structure
of the economic control variables, and restricting the country sample to different sets of
countries does not change the main results. These robustness checks further lend sup-
port to the above proposition that spending only increases in the number of parties to
the extent that the strongest party controls little exit power. As its share of exit power
increases, this effect is mitigated.
2.6 Conclusion
To summarize, I find that spending only increases in the number of governing parties
if the strongest government party controls little exit power. As the strongest party’s share
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of exit power increases, this effect is mitigated. These findings help answer the broader
question of why some junior coalition members can extract significantly greater conces-
sions from their partners than others.
I argue that junior coalition members’ ability to extract concessions from their part-
ners is determined by the credibility of their exit threats. Exit threats, in turn, are only
credible if junior partners have outside options of great expected utility, that is, alterna-
tive governments they can enter that are both viable and attractive. Since all power is
relative, a junior party’s share of exit power determines the extent to which it can extract
concessions from its coalition partners. Junior coalition members can extract greater con-
cessions, the more relative exit power they control. Those that lack relative bargainig
power, on the other hand, are willing to grant concessions to remain in office.
The extent to which junior parties are able to extract concessions is reflected in the
government budget. I argue that spending only increases in the number of governing
parties to the extent that the strongest party holds little exit power. In this case, the
strongest party has to grant concessions to its coalition partners to remain in office. As
the strongest party’s share of exit power increases, however, this effect is mitigated. At
the extreme where the strongest party holds all exit power, only this one party can extract
concessions, so adding more parties to the coalition does not affect spending.
I develop a new measure of relative exit power that is theoretically motivated and
computationally complex. This new measure captures governing parties’ strategic posi-
tions relative to their coalition partners and calculates how viable and attractive every
outside option is that these parties can enter. I construct this measure for all parties that
entered government office in developed democracies during the post-war era. I use it to
analyze government spending in developed democracies between 1970 and 2012 and find
support for my proposition. Spending only increases in the number of governing parties
to the extent that the strongest party controls little exit power. As exit power becomes
more concentrated in the strongest party, this effect is mitigated.
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This chapter makes three important contributions. First, I conceptualize bargaining
power as deriving from governing parties’ credible exit threats. The credibility of par-
ties’ exit threats explains the great variation in junior coalition members’ ability to extract
concessions – variation that previous arguments of government formation and multiparty
policy-making cannot explain. Second, I develop a new, theoretically motivated measure
of governing parties’ relative exit power. This new measure captures the expected utility
of every potential government that a government party can enter. I construct it for all gov-
erning parties in developed democracies between 1945 and 2012. Third, I demonstrate
that the extent to which exit power is concentrated in one coalition member explains vari-
ation in government spending.
Opening the black box of multiparty policy-making has wide-ranging implications for
a variety of different policy areas, coalition negotiations, and government stability. More-
over, analyzing parties’ relative exit power also greatly improves our understanding of
inter-party bargaining and competition. In addition, understanding intra-governmental
bargaining and its effect on policy-making has further implications for questions of rep-
resentation. Shining light on policy-making in multiparty governments can help us gain
a better understanding of whose interests are better represented and why.
This chapter also prompts several new venues of resarch. Two important questions
immediately arise: How does Exit Power affect the relative policymaking influence of
ideologically diverse governing parties and the composition of the government budget?
How does relative bargaining power affect the leverage of potential coalition partners
and the allocation of ministerial portfolios across government parties? I answer these
two questions and provide further tests of the general hypothesis derived in this chapter
in the next two chapters. I find that the composition of the government budget resembles
spending preferences of powerful parties more closely. Moreover, government parties’
exit power has a positive effect on the salience-weighted share of portfolios they receive.
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2.7 Technical Appendix: Measuring Exit Power
In this project, I generate a new measure of bargaining power that captures each ac-
tor’s next best options in the event of a bargaining breakdown. In this context, where
actors are government parties, a government dissolution constitutes a bargaining break-
down. Such a breakdown can be followed by early elections or a reshuffle of government
parties, however, all parliamentary parties enter a new government formation process in
such a situaion (Lupia & Strøm 1995). Thus, to generate the novel exit power measure,
the unit of observation is each government formation process.
Table 2.5: The Number of Potential Governments











In any parliament containing n parliamentary parties, 2n − 1 potential governments
can form. Table 5 reports the number of total potential governments for a parliament con-
taining three to twelve parties. To adequately capture each government party’s outside
options, I simulate all 2n − 1 potential governments that can form during each formation
process in developed democracies between the first democratic election after 1945 and
2012. The full sample of countries for which I generate this measure includes Australia,
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Nether-
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lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. In total, the number of potential governments is almost 120,000.
I do not exclude any government a priori, that is, I simulate all single-party minority
governments up to the government containing all parliamentary parties. Table 6 gives an
example for a parliament containing four parliamentary parties, A, B, C, and D.
Table 2.6: Potential Governments in a 4-Party Parliament
Parliamentary Parties Potential Governments
Single-party Governments A, B, C, D
2-Party Coalitions AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD
3-Party Coalitions ABC, ABD, ACD, BCD
4-Party Coalition ABCD
Two types of data are crucial for the exit power measure – each party’s number of par-
liamentary seats and its ideological position. I obtain the number of parliamentary seats
from a variety of sources and cross-validate them. If discrepancies appear between the
first two sources, I consult additional sources. I use the election data from the ParlGov
project (Döring & Manow 2012) as the baseline and merge the Comparative Manifestos
Project (CMP) data (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013) to this
data set to add in parties that are not covered by the ParlGov data. For European coun-
tries, I cross-validate the number of seats per party obtained from the ParlGov database
with data from Parties and Elections (Nordsieck 1997–2016). In case the numbers di-
verge, I use the yearly political data from the European Journal of Political Research
(EJPR 1974–2011) from 1973 onwards and the International Almanac of Electoral His-
tory (Mackie & Rose 1991) for elections prior to 1973. In some cases, I resolve discrep-
ancies by consulting national sources (e.g., Portugal9). For Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand, I use national sources10 and the International Almanac of Electoral History up
9Assembly of the Republic of Portugal (2014)
10Elections Electoral Commission. New Zealand (2015); Parliament of Canada (2015); The University of
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until 1973 and the EJPR data from 1973 onwards to check the seat numbers obtained
from the ParlGov database. In case of discrepancies, I opt to use the data obtained from
national sources.
Parties’ ideological positions can be obtained from the Comparative Manifestos Project
(CMP) (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013), the Chapel Hill
Expert Surveys (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2012), and a number of additional expert surveys
(Benoit & Laver 2006; F. G. Castles & Mair 1984; J. Huber & Inglehart 1995; Laver & Hunt
1992). All ideological positions are based on the general lef-right dimension rather than
more specific policy dimensions. I compare the coverage of parties and elections as well
as the ideological positions of parties obtained from these sources. The total coverage of
parties and elections is greatest for the CMP data as they cover all parties running for
office in all general elections since 1945. The sample of parties covered and the temporal
coverage in expert surveys, on the other hand, is smaller with the first data obtained in
the early 1980s in Castles and Mair’s work (F. G. Castles & Mair 1984). On the other hand,
parties’ positions are more volatile in the CMP data, with parties often leapfrogging ove
others from one election to the next. Nonetheless, I choose to use the more comprehen-
sive CMP data as the source of ideological positions because using expert surveys would
exclude a considerable number of government parties, particularly new parties entering
office after a short tenure in parliament.
Using all parliamentary parties’ seats and ideological positions, I generate the follow-
ing variables for each potential government: a dummy variable each denoting its sta-
tus as a single-party majority government, a majority government, a minimum winning
coalition, an ideologically connected coalition, and one denoting its status as a surplus
government. Finally, I also calculate the ideological range between the two most extreme
parties in each potential government and generate a dummy variable indicating if the
government in fact entered office. I use all of these variables in a conditional logit model
Western Australia (2015)
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to estimate each potential government’s political viability, that is, the likelihood of it en-








Here, I regress the government’s status as having entered office on the remaining vari-
ables I generated and calculate a predicted value for each potential government. I use this
value as the government’s formation likelihood. As expected, only governments’ surplus
status and ideological range have a negative effect on their likelihood of entering office.
This first component of the exit power measure ranges between zero and one and is the
same for each member of the government.
The second component of the bargaining measure ought to capture how attractive
each outside option is to each of its members. Thus, this component varies across gov-
ernment members. I calculate each government’s seat share-weighted average ideological
position and the distance between this and each member’s own ideological position. For
single-party governments, this distance is zero as the government’s average ideological
position is the same as the party’s position. Thus, as this distance measures each govern-
ment’s disutility, I re-scale the measure by subtracting the empirical maximum disutility
per country. For ease of interpretation, I multiply this measure by (−1) to restrict it to
positive values. Moreover, I take the square root of the value to account for likely overes-
timation of movement in the CMP data as can be seen from the many leapfrogging cases.
Finally, for each government party, I multiply the viability of each of its outside op-
tions by its attractiveness and sum these expected utilites. I exclude the incumbent gov-
ernment and generate each party’s exit power as the share of exit power it contributes to
the sum of all government parties’ exit power. Again, this measure is one for all single-
party governments. In sum, I calculate this new exit power measure for almost 1,200
parties in government.
By measuring both each potential government’s viability and ideological appeal, this
measure can account for changes in the expected utility of an outside option that stem
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from a change in either its viability, ideological attractiveness, or both. Figures 6 and 7
depict a parliament containing three parliamentary parties A, B, and C. They start with
the classic kingmaker case and illustrate changes in the expected utility of outside op-
tions deriving from a change in its attractiveness (Figure 6) and its viability (Figure 7).







Suppose that in both Figures, parties A and B are in a two-party coalition together. In
the top panel, party B has greater relative exit power than party A because B can enter a
majority coalition with C as well, and C is equally close to B’s ideal position as A. In the
lower panel, however, B’s exit power decreases. While it can still enter a majority govern-
ment with C, party C’s ideological position is now farther away from B’s, so B’s threats to
exit the coalition with party A are less credible in the lower panel than in the top panel.
The top panel of Figure 7 is identical to that of Figure 6. Again, party B can credibly
threaten to exit the incumbent coalition and enter a coalition with party C. In the lower
panel, however, a new party enters parliament, garnering some of party C’s votes. Party C
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is still equally close to B as in the top panel, however, the coalition of parties B and C now
does not cross the parliamentary majority threshold any longer. Thus, again, compared to
the top panel party B’s exit threats are less credible because its outside option of entering
office with C is less viable. In reality, both ideological positions and parliamentary seats
change from one election to the next, and the exit power measure captures changes to
each party’s exit power stemming from a change in viability, ideological appeal, or both.
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The fact that exit power can reflect changes in parties’ bargaining power caused by
changes in the distribution of seats across all parliamentary parties as well as changes in
the ideological position of all parliamentary parties constitutes an advantage over other
measures of bargaining power. Moreover, exit power is measured based on all potential
governments that can form, not excluding any subset of governments a priori. Finally,
not all of those governments are treated as equally likely to occur. Instead, I estimate the
formation likelihood of every single one using a number of factors that have been shown
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to influence whether or not a potential government in fact enters office.
In contrast, existing measures of bargaining power, such as the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf
1965) and the Shapley Shubik index (Shapley & Shubik 1954) measure the share of mini-
mum winning coalitions for which parties are pivotal. Similarly, voting weights are based
on the number of minimum winning coalitions parties can enter (Ansolabehere et al.
2005). Moreover, in all three measures, all minimum winning coalitions are weighted
equally (Leech 2013), irrespective of which particular parties comprise the coalition.
While restricting the set of coalitions to be considered to minimum winning coalitions
greatly simplifies computation, in reality less than half of all coalitions that form are, in
fact, minimum winning. In the post-war era, one third of all coalitions that formed are
minority governments (Crombez 1996; Strøm 1984), and one fourth are surplus govern-
ments (Volden & Carrubba 2004). Thus, by excluding these coalitions that can be viable
and attractive, existing measures of bargaining power miss important aspects of inter-
party bargaining. In contrast, exit power adequately captures these dynamics.
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2.8 Appendix 1: Robustness Checks
In this section, I will discuss a number of robustness checks that I perform. The main
results from Table 3 are robust to a variety of different model specifications.
First, I replicate and extend the analyses of two leading studies on the relationship
between government parties and spending, Bawn and Rosenbluth’s (2006) and Martin
and Vanberg’s studies (2013) (see Table 7). I replicate their original findings (column 1),
restrict their sample to coalitions (column 2), and extend the model specification to ac-
count for the strongest party’s exit power. In all analyses, the control variables are the
same as in their original studies.
Restricting Bawn and Rosenbluth’s original sample to coalition governments increases
the magnitude of the coefficient of the number of parties. Accounting for exit power con-
centration further changes the results. If the strongest party controls no exit power at all,
adding one more party to the coalition increases spending by almost one percent of GDP.
This effect is statistically significant at the one percent level and greater in magnitude
than the results presented above. As the strongest party’s share of exit power increases,
this effect is again mitigated. An additional governing party does not lead to greater
spending if the strongest party controls great exit power (see top half of Table 7).
In contrast, the number of government parties has a smaller and statistically insignif-
icant effect on spending if Martin and Vanberg’s sample is restricted to coalition gov-
ernments. Accounting for the strongest party’s share of exit power further supports the
proposition derived above. Adding a party to the government increases spending by 0.56
percent of GDP if the strongest party controls no exit power and budgetary constraints
are held at zero. As exit power becomes more concentrated in the strongest party, that
is, as its share of exit power increases, an additional governing party does not increase
spending (see lower half of Table 7).
Controlling for the effective number of legislative parties does not alter results, either
(see Table 8, columns 1 and 2). In addition, accounting for an AR(1) process also leads to
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the same results (see Table 8, columns 3 and 4). Controlling only for the lags or changes
of the economic controls again supports the proposition derived above (see Table 9). Fi-
nally, excluding France due to its majoritarian electoral and semi-presidential system,
which lead to a different bargaining environment, does not change the results, either (re-
sults not shown here). As in the main analysis, government spending only increases in
the number of governing parties to the extent that the strongest party controls relatively
little exit power. As its exit power increases, this effect is mitigated.
Table 2.7: Replication and Extension of Previous Studies
Full Replication Extension
Replication Coalitions Exit Power
Bawn & Rosenbluth (2006)
Number of Partiest−1 0.451∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.152) (0.302)
Exit Power Strongest Partyt−1 3.183∗∗
(1.595)
Number of Partiest−1 × Strongestt−1 -0.920∗
(0.488)
Observations 447 297 293
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Martin & Vanberg (2013)
Number of Partiest−1 0.367∗∗ 0.101 0.563∗
(0.167) (0.248) (0.292)
Exit Power Strongest Partyt−1 4.036∗∗∗
(1.503)
Number of Partiest−1 × Strongestt−1 -1.342∗∗
(0.632)
Observations 511 334 326
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables suppressed
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Additional Controls and AR(1)
Additional AR(1)
Controls Process
Number of Partiest−1 0.525∗∗ 0.523∗∗ 0.582∗∗ 0.529∗∗
(0.217) (0.229) (0.231) (0.236)
Exit Power Strongest Partyt−1 2.590∗ 2.798∗ 2.645∗ 2.954∗∗
(1.436) (1.443) (1.475) (1.466)
Number of Partiest−1 × Strongestt−1 -0.954 -1.087 -1.060 -1.114
(0.722) (0.733) (0.750) (0.752)
Exit Power Ideologyt−1 -0.0133∗∗ -0.0105 -0.0136∗∗ -0.0108
(0.00552) (0.00691) (0.00579) (0.00714)
Eff. No. Legislative Partiest−1 0.0540 -0.0971
(0.0841) (0.124)
Spendingt−1 0.937∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0339) (0.0168) (0.0352)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.110 -0.0957 -0.0736 -0.0777
(0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.114)
Unemployment Rate 0.0106 0.0951 -0.0207 0.0906
(0.116) (0.112) (0.120) (0.115)
GDP per capitat−1 1.411∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.173) (0.181) (0.175)
GDP per capita -1.426∗∗∗ -1.470∗∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗ -1.488∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.177) (0.183) (0.179)
Dependent Populationt−1 0.825∗ 0.466 0.803 0.455
(0.476) (0.458) (0.503) (0.477)
Dependent Population -0.848∗ -0.590 -0.823 -0.580
(0.479) (0.451) (0.506) (0.470)
Opennesst−1 3.451∗∗ 3.939∗∗∗ 3.638∗∗∗ 4.266∗∗∗
(1.408) (1.385) (1.409) (1.379)
Openness -3.083∗∗ -3.302∗∗ -3.252∗∗ -3.530∗∗
(1.451) (1.447) (1.455) (1.453)
Constant 3.643∗ 15.11∗∗∗ 3.920∗ 15.58∗∗∗
(2.148) (4.327) (2.307) (4.471)
R2 0.927 0.933 0.918 0.925
Observations 527 527 527 527
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Different Specification of Controls
Lags Changes
Only
Number of Partiest−1 0.648∗∗ 0.510∗ 0.395∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.254) (0.267) (0.208) (0.225)
Exit Power Strongest Partyt−1 3.189∗∗ 3.024∗ 1.603 2.728∗
(1.574) (1.601) (1.394) (1.428)
Number of Partiest−1 × Strongestt−1 -1.448∗ -1.244 -0.868 -0.934
(0.774) (0.805) (0.727) (0.742)
Exit Power Ideologyt−1 -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0109
(0.00658) (0.00806) (0.00552) (0.00688)
Spendingt−1 0.953∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0372) (0.0144) (0.0238)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0596)
GDP per capitat−1 -0.00614 0.0129
(0.0164) (0.0327)




∆ Unemployment Rate 0.0698 0.121
(0.114) (0.109)
∆ GDP per capita -1.405∗∗∗ -1.387∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.180)
∆ Dependent Population -0.720 -0.716∗
(0.453) (0.429)
∆ Openness -3.327∗∗ -3.565∗∗∗
(1.409) (1.384)
Constant 3.274 6.747 3.714∗∗∗ 9.129∗∗∗
(2.314) (5.012) (0.991) (1.534)
R2 0.906 0.911 0.926 0.932
Observations 528 528 527 527
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER III
Dividing the Pie: Exit Power and the Composition of the
Government Budget
3.1 Introduction
Under what conditions are government parties able to influence which policy areas
are prioritized and receive more spending than others? In the German general election
of 2013, the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) won 311 of 631 parliamentary seats, a
mere five seats shy of a simple majority (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). They were described as
the clear winner of the election (Geis December 19, 2013), but still had to enter a coali-
tion government. Given their success in the election, one might expect them to fare well
during coalition negotiations and to easily implement their electoral platform. The ensu-
ing coalition negotiations, however, were the longest since the end of the Second World
War (Geis December 19, 2013), and the Christian Democrats were heralded as the losing
party (Geis December 19, 2013) with their government partner, the Social Democratic
Party, receiving great policy concessions in the coalition agreement, most importantly the
rollout of a federal minimum wage (Schuler et al. November 27, 2013).
Why was the clear winner of the election unable to have its way during coalition nego-
tiations? Why were the Social Democrats, controlling 118 fewer seats than the Christian
Democrats, able to include many more of their policy position in the coalition agreement
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than the Christian Democrats? In this chapter, I argue that government parties’ ability to
prioritize policy areas over others and to spend more on these core policy areas increases
in their relative exit power. Parties can only credibly threaten to exit the incumbent gov-
ernment if they can enter at least one alternative government that is likely to form and
ideologically attractive to them. Therefore, parties’ exit power increases in the credibility
of their exit threats. In the above example, the Christian Democrats had to enter a grand
coalition with the Social Democrats because their previous government partner did not
enter parliament. Some members even stated the party had no choice but to enter this
coalition (Zeit Online December 9, 2013). The Social Democratic Party, in contrast, had
other options, and was, thus, able to make their government participation conditional on
implementing key campaign promises (Schuler et al. November 27, 2013).
Parties’ ability to prioritize their core policies is reflected in the composition of the
government budget. First, implementing new policies or extending the reach of exist-
ing ones requires additional funds, and thus, has spending implications. Second, given
(external) pressures to decrease overall spending due to high levels of government debt
and deficits, increasing spending in one area puts pressure on governments to decrease
spending in the remaining areas. As such, since increasing spending on one policy area
has a direct effect on the composition of the entire budget, governments are faced with
complex trade-offs between individual spending categories. I expect the allocation of
money across policy areas to reflect parties’ spending preferences more closely if they
control great exit power.
I use a novel measure of governing parties’ exit power to test this expectation. The
measure is comparable across countries and over time and captures the formation likeli-
hood and ideological attractiveness of all governing parties’ outside options. I generate
this measure from a simulation of almost 120,000 potential governments that could have
formed in developed democracies during the postwar era. In contrast to the existing lit-
erature, I analyze spending on different spending categories simultaneously to account
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for dependencies and trade-offs across these categories.
Analyzing the composition of the government budget in developed democracies from
1995 to 2011, I find that, compared to other spending categories, security spending in-
creases in the exit power of right-wing parties. This increase comes at the expense of all
other spending categories, but the trade-off is strongest between security and spending
on the environment and economic affairs. Moreover, environmental spending decreases
in the exit power of right-wing parties. While this decrease benefits all other spending
categories, redistribution, security, and education benefit most. Thus, this analysis shows
that government parties can influence the allocation of money across spending categories
if they have great exit power. Moreover, spending trade-offs in the budget are more com-
plex than the existing literature suggests.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief
overview of differences in parties’ spending preferences. In the following section, I intro-
duce my argument that parties’ bargaining leverage depends on the credibility of their
exit threats and derive a testable proposition regarding the composition of the govern-
ment budget. Next, I describe the data and method used before discussing the results
of simultaneous analyses of spending on different spending areas. The final section pro-
vides a summary and concludes.
3.2 Differences in Parties’ Spending Preferences
Government parties differ with respect to which policies they prioritize, and hence
their spending preferences. The typical way of differentiating between policy priorities
is to contrast left- and right-wing parties. Parties located on the left of the ideological
dimension cater to constituents that are most vulnerable to unemployment, for instance,
so they tend to increase redistribution to alleviate potentially adverse effects on their
core constituents (Hibbs 1987). Thus, governments composed of left-wing parties are
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expected to spend more on welfare than governments composed of right-wing parties.
Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993) and Hicks and Swank (1992), for instance, find that
an increase in the seat share of left-wing parties in government is associated with greater
redistribution, a more expansive public sector, and higher welfare spending. However,
this is not the case if left-wing governments are faced with a strong center or right-wing
opposition in parliament (Hicks & Swank 1992).
Recent research has extended its focus to the determinants of welfare state retrench-
ment, finding that right-wing cabinets are more likely to retrench than left-wing govern-
ments (Korpi & Palme 2003). Allan and Scruggs find that left-wing cabinets are asso-
ciated with an increase in welfare state efforts only until the early 1980s. For the time
period after the early 1980s, in contrast, right-wing governments are associated with cuts
to welfare state efforts (Allan & Scruggs 2004). Lipsmeyer (2011), however, finds that par-
tisan differences in welfare spending are conditional on economic conditions. Changes
in welfare spending are consistent with the government’s ideological composition during
economic booms, while there are few differences during busts (Lipsmeyer 2011).
In addition to cutting welfare state spending, right-wing parties are expected to fo-
cus on curbing inflation as their core constituents are adversely affected by high inflation
(Hibbs 1987). Moreover, governments comprised of right-wing governments are seen
as “more hawkish” than those comprised of left-wing parties (Koch & Cranmer 2007, p.
314). As such right-wing governments are expected to increase spending on defense, even
at the expense of other policies (Narizny 2003; Palmer 1990). Given these vastly different
emphases on policy areas, early research on government expenditures posits that gov-
ernment spending should exhibit a trade-off between guns, i.e. right-wing priorities, and
butter, i.e. left-wing priorities (Russett 1969). The empirical evidence for such spend-
ing trade-offs, however, is mixed at best. Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher find such
trade-offs only if they include post-war years, specifically 1948 to 1954, in their sample
(Domke, Eichenberg, & Kelleher 1983). Similarly, Palmer finds trade-offs between de-
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fense and social spending only in small NATO countries (Palmer 1990). While Mintz and
Huang do not find trade-offs between defense and welfare spending, they find that ed-
ucation spending decreases as defense spending increases (Mintz & Huang 1991). They
argue that this is an indirect trade-off because defense spending dampens growth, which
then decreases education spending (Mintz & Huang 1991).
In addition to differences in welfare and defense spending, education spending has
also been analyzed through the lens of partisan policy-making (Busemeyer 2009). Cas-
tles (1989) argues that governments composed of left-wing parties spend more on edu-
cation than those composed of right-wing parties as part of their emphasis on redistri-
bution. Boix (1997; 1998) arrives at the same expectation, arguing that left-wing parties
invest more heavily in education as part of their “interventionist supply-side strategy”
which aims at increasing “the productivity of capital and labor” (Boix 1997, p. 817).
The empirical evidence for the general expectation that left-wing parties spend more on
education, however, is mixed, especially for the recent time period (Ansell 2008; Jensen
2011). Jensen (2011) and Ansell (2008) find that right-wing parties are more in favor of
expanding education since their core constituents participate more in and benefit more
from education. In addition, Busemeyer and his co-authors analyze which party fami-
lies have issue-ownership of education policies (Busemeyer, Franzmann, & Garritzmann
2013). They find that, in the majority of Western European countries, Social Democratic
and Liberal parties own education policies, however, in at least one quarter of their sam-
ple, Conservative parties are the respective issue-owners (Busemeyer et al. 2013).
The existing literature examining the determinants of government spending on cer-
tain policy areas generally analyzes one or two policy area in isolation or the trade-offs
between them. Research on the entire composition of the budget, in contrast, is less
concerned with the effects of political processes – particularly intra-governmental bar-
gaining and decision-making. Creedy and colleagues, for instance, find that “variations
in expenditure patterns indeed reflect differences in preferences resulting from cultural
55
differences across democratic countries” (Creedy, Li, & Moslehi 2011, p. 95). Elsewhere,
Creedy and Moslehi (2009) find that governments tend to spend more on public goods
relative to transfers, the less skewed wages are. Finally, greater corruption leads to less
spending on education and health relative to other spending items (Mauro 1998).
In this chapter, I analyze under what conditions parties are able to implement their
policy and spending preferences. In contrast, to existing research, I examine the composi-
tion of the entire budget. In the next section, I discuss what enables parties to implement
their policy priorities and how this affects how funds are allocated across different spend-
ing areas.
3.3 Implementing Spending Preferences
Once in government, parties seek to implement policies that maximize their chances
of remaining in office. That is, governing parties seek to implement policies, and thereby
increase associated spending, that cater to their voters. Not doing so carries the risk of
losing votes and even government office entirely in the next general election. In the US
context, Lowry, Alt, and Feree, for instance, find that Republicans in state elections are
punished for greater spending and higher taxes, while Democrats are not (Lowry, Alt, &
Ferree 1998). Similarly, Giger and Nelson analyze how parties fare at general elections
and find that liberal and religious parties in fact gain votes after having reduced welfare
efforts while in office (Giger & Nelson 2010).
This relationship between government parties’ electoral performance and the policies
previously implemented is more complicated for coalition partners since coalition gover-
nance rests on members compromising to implement policies. Parties are more likely to
lose votes during general elections if they (appear to) have compromised too much dur-
ing the legislative term (Fortunato in press; Martin & Vanberg 2011). Fortunato finds that
voters are, indeed, less likely to vote for an incumbent party that compromises on poli-
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cies (Fortunato in press). This is because voters are more likely to punish compromising
parties for bad outcomes and less likely to reward them for positive ones. In addition,
compromising parties are more likely to be punished if they are ideologically far away
from voters’ own positions. Both of these mechanisms hold particularly for voters who
previously supported a compromising party (Fortunato in press).
Therefore, all government parties have the incentive to implement their policy priori-
ties to remain in office and not be punished at the polls. However, they differ with respect
to their ability to do so. I argue that parties’ ability to successfully implement their policy
priorities is determined by their relative bargaining power. At one extreme, parties that
do not need a coalition partner to enter office are able to implement all of their policy
preferences as they do not have to compromise. At the other extreme, a coalition party
that does not have any bargaining power is unable to implement its policies at all. As
such, parties can only increase spending on their policy priorities if they control great
exit power. A government party has great exit power if it can credibly threaten to exit
the incumbent government. Parties can only credibly threaten to leave the incumbent
government if they can enter at least one alternative government that is viable and ideo-
logically attractive.
First, alternative governments differ in their viability as not all of them are equally
likely to enter office. Governments are more likely to form, the fewer parties they contain
(Riker 1962) and the closer member parties are to each other ideologically (Axelrod 1970;
De Swaan 1973). Each alternative government’s viability is constant across its members.
Second, the same alternative government is not equally attractive to each of its members.
The closer each outside option’s ideological position is to an individual member party’s
ideal position, the more attractive it is to this particular party. This is the case because
this party can reasonably expect the government’s policy output to be close to its ideal
policies. Therefore, an outside option is of great expected utility if it is likely to form and
ideologically attractive. A governing party can credibly threaten to exit the incumbent
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government if it can enter at least one alternative government of great expected utility.
Since the expected utility of each outside option is based on parties’ parliamentary seats
and ideological positions, both of which are common knowledge, coalition parties know
how powerful their partners are.
I argue that governing parties’ ability to implement their ideologically motivated
spending increases in their exit power. Bargaining power, however, is an inherently rel-
ative concept so the extent to which governing parties can use exit threats to their ad-
vantage depends on their own as well as their partners’ bargaining power. A party that
has outside options of great expected utility can only implement its ideal policies if its
partners lack such options. As such, government parties’ willingness to implement poli-
cies not in line with their ideal policy program decreases in their relative exit power. If
all governing parties have outside options of (roughly) the same expected utility, none
has a relative bargaining advantage, so the government’s policies will be an equal mix of
coalition members’ preferred policies.
At the two extremes of relative bargaining power, a governing party can control all or
no exit power at all. If one party controls all exit power, it is able to implement its policy
preferences without having to compromise with its partners. Conversely, if a governing
party controls no relative exit power at all, it cannot implement its preferred policies.
Such a party has no leverage over its partners since it cannot credibly threaten to exit the
incumbent government. In between these extremes, I expect parties’ ability to implement
their policies to increase in their relative exit power.
Implementing policies always has spending implications, so I expect the composition
of the government budget to reflect the degree to which a party concentrates exit power
in its hands. I expect that governments spend more on those spending areas that most
closely align with powerful governing parties’ policy preferences. That is, I expect wel-
fare spending to increase if left-wing parties have great exit power, while I expect defense
spending to increase if right-wing parties are powerful in government. Parties that are
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able to implement their preferred policies can then claim credit for putting greater em-
phasis on policy areas their core voters care most about. This also enables parties to
demonstrate to their core voters that they can deliver on their election promises once in
office.
However, governments face budget constraints, particularly those countries that are
expected to comply with the EU Stability and Growth Pact1. Therefore, an increase in
one spending area puts pressure on governments to decrease spending in the remaining
spending categories. Given this increased pressure to decrease total spending, I expect
to see trade-offs between spending areas. However, in contrast to previous research, I ex-
pect such trade-offs to involve more spending categories than simply welfare and defense
spending. Therefore, I argue that governing parties increase spending on policy areas
that align most closely with their core ideological profile at the expense of spending on
the remaining areas. For instance, I expect spending on defense to increase relative to all
other spending areas in the exit power of right-wing government parties.
Proposition. Relative to other spending areas, governing parties spend more on their policy
priorities as their relative exit power increases.
In contrast to previous research, I analyze all spending areas simultaneously to ac-
count for dependencies across spending shares. In the following sections, I will describe
the data and method used to test the above proposition. Since spending on all spending
categories has to sum up to one, OLS regressions are not appropriate to capture the de-
pendencies across spending areas. Instead, I use seemingly unrelated regressions.
1Governments are required to keep the budget deficit at below three percent of GDP and government
debt at below 60 percent of GDP (European Commission 2016).
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3.4 Data and Method
3.4.1 Main Independent Variable – Exit Power
In this section, I describe the data used to test the proposition derived above, starting
with a new measure of governing parties’ exit power. Using all parliamentary parties’
seats (Döring & Manow 2012; EJPR 1974–2011; Mackie & Rose 1991; Nordsieck 1997–
2016) and their ideological position on the general left-right scale (Budge et al. 2001;
Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013), I simulate all potential governments that
could have formed in developed democracies during the post-war era. This yields around
120,000 potential governments that include all single-party governments (minority and
majority) up to the government containing all parliamentary parties. From this data set,
I estimate each potential government’s formation likelihood and calculate how attractive
it is to each of its members.
I follow Martin and Stevenson’s (2001) approach to estimate each potential govern-
ment’s formation likelihood. Thus, I use a conditional logit model regressing whether
or not a government formed on a number of variables that have been found to affect a
potential government’s likelihood of entering office. These explanatory variables include
the government’s ideological range and dummy variables indicating its status as a single-
party majority government, a majority or surplus government, a minimum winning coali-
tion, and whether its members are ideologically adjacent to each other (connected). Since
compromise is harder to reach if there are more actors in office and the farther apart their
ideological preferences are, I expect the ideological range and a government’s status as a
surplus coalition to decrease its formation likelihood. I expect the remaining variables
to have a positive effect on the formation likelihood. The results of the conditional logit
model support these expectations. I generate the predicted values from this estimation
and use them as the measure of each potential government’s fomation likelihood. This
measure is constrained between zero and one and is constant for each potential govern-
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ment member.
For the attractiveness of each potential government, I calculate the distance between
each member party’s and the potential government’s position. I use each potential gov-
ernment’s center of gravity as the measure of its ideological position. For this, I generate
the seat share-weighted average ideological position of all government parties. Since a
government’s attractiveness to a particular party decreases in its distance to this party, I
re-scale the measure, restrict it to positive values for ease of interpretation, and take the
square root2.
Finally, I calculate the expected utility of each potential government for each of its
member parties. I do this by multiplying its party-specific attractiveness by its formation
likelihood. To generate each government party’s exit power, I sum the expected utilities
of all outside options that a government party can enter, excluding the government that
in fact formed. Since I argue that a party’s relative exit power determines its ability to
implement policies, I calculate the share of exit power each government party controls.
That means I divide each governing party’s exit power by the sum of all governing parties’
exit power. I generate this relative exit power measure for all parties that were in office
in developed democracies between the first democratic election after the Second World
War and 20123. Parties that are in a single-party majority government have a relative exit
power of one since no other party contributes to the government’s total exit power.
Using the new measure of government parties’ exit power as weights, I generate the
main explanatory variable as the weighted average ideological position of the incumbent
government, Government Ideology. Governments in which right-wing parties have greater
leverage over their partners are, thus, placed farther to the right on the general left-right
2I do this by multiplying the measure by (−1) and adding the observed maximum disutility in each
country. Compared to other measures of parties’ policy positions, such as expert surveys, the CMP data
exhibit more and greater changes in parties’ ideological positions. Moreover, such changes often involve
parties leapfrogging over others. This suggests that changes tend to be over-estimated, so I use the square
root of outside options’ utility to transform the attractiveness measure.
3For the Eastern European countries in my sample, I calculate each governing party’s relative exit power
starting with the second democratic election after democratization.
61
dimension. I weight each party’s left-right score from the Comparative Manifestos Project
(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013) by its relative exit power,
so positive values of the Government Ideology variable reflect governments in which right-
wing parties have great exit power. In contrast, governments in which left-wing parties
have great exit power receive negative values.
3.4.2 Dependent Variable and Controls
I gather data on total government expenditure on specific budget items from the
OECD (OECD 2015). These spending items include general public services, defense,
public order and safety, economic affairs, environment, housing, health, recreation and
culture, education, and social protection. I generate the share of total spending on each
of these items and aggregate these ten categories into broader ones. First, I aggregate all
spending categories associated with left-wing policy priorities into a Left category. This
category contains social protection, health, housing, and environmental spending. Sim-
ilarly, I aggregate right-wing priorities, defense as well as public order and safety, into
a Right category. The remaining budget items (general public services, economic affairs,
education, and recreation and culture) are aggregated into a Misc category since I do not
have a priori expectations as to which party seeks to increase spending on them. While
the theoretical expectations are unclear regarding education spending, economic affairs
lumps together individual items that can clearly be associated with parties’ ideological
preferences, however, expectations cannot be drawn for the overall economic affairs cat-
egory.
In addition, I aggregate the ten spending categories into more specific ones. I keep
spending on the Environment, Education, and Economic Affairs as separate spending cate-
gories. For both Education and Economic Affairs, it is unclear if right-wing parties increase
or decrease spending as they gain exit power. Spending on the Environment is kept as a
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separate category because, while it is a left-wing priority, it is a rather recent one. Social
protection, health, and housing are aggregated into a Redistribution category, reflecting
traditional left-wing priorities. As before, conservative spending priorities (defense and
public order and safety) are aggregated into a Security category. Finally, the remaining
categories, general public services and recreation and culture, are grouped into an Other
category.
I estimate seemingly unrelated regressions using spending at all levels of aggregation.
With respect to the proposition derived above, I expect the share of total spending al-
located to Right priorities relative to Left and Misc categories to increase in right-wing
parties’ exit power. In contrast, I expect spending on Left priorities to decrease relative to
Right spending as right-wing parties control greater exit power in government. With re-
spect to the slighlty more disaggregated categories, I expect security spending relative to
redistribution and the environment to increase in right-wing parties’ exit power. In con-
trast, I expect government spending on redistribution and the environment to decrease
relative to security spending in right-wing parties’ exit power. Again, I do not have a
priori expectations for the trade-off between education and economic spending relative
to traditional right- and left-wing priorities.
As described above and in greater detail in the next section, I estimate the determi-
nants of spending on different categories simultaneously to analyze the spending trade-
offs governments dominated by different parties make. In each equation, I control for
the effect of GDP growth (Armingeon et al. 2015). Moreover, for redistributive spending
and its components, I also control for the unemployment rate and the share of the pop-
ulation older than 65 (OECD 2015). In the education equation, I control for the share of
the population younger than 15 (OECD 2015). I expect all of these control variables to
have a positive effect on spending shares. Finally, for security spending and its compo-
nents, I include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the country is part of the
Schengen agreement (European Commission 2016). I expect this variable to have a neg-
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ative effect on security spending since border controls were abolished for countries that
are part of the Schengen area. Since the budget for t is passed at t − 1, I use the first lag
of all explanatory variables. In all estimations, I control for the lagged dependent vari-
able to account for serially correlated errors and include country-fixed effects to account
for heteroskedasticity (Beck 2001; Beck & Katz 1996). Finally, I restrict my analyses to
parliamentary systems and semi-presidential systems that are dominated by parliament
since the bargaining context in presidential systems and semi-presidential systems where
the president has great power is more complicated than reflected in my argument. Due to
restrictions on the availability of spending data, my final sample covers annual spending
data from 1995 to 2011 and includes Western and Eastern Europe as well as Canada4.
3.4.3 Method
In this section, I describe the method I use to test the above proposition. As described
above, the existing literature so far has tested the relationship between governments’ ide-
ological positions and spending by analyzing one spending category as a share of GDP,
not taking into account the remaining spending categories that together make up the
government budget. However, data on the allocation of money across different spend-
ing categories are compositional. Given budget constraints, an increase in one category
increases the pressure to decrease spending on the remaining categories. Moreover, all
spending shares sum up to one. As Tomz and colleagues describe, estimating data with
such characteristics using OLS imposes assumptions on these data that are not appro-
priate: “First, OLS assumes that the dependent variable is theoretically unbounded and
could fall anywhere on the real number line, whereas in reality each [party’s] share [...]
must lie between 0 and 1. Second, OLS treats [...] each [share] independently, but they are
4The complete sample of countries includes: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
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not independent because the proportions for all parties must sum to 1” (Tomz, Tucker, &
Wittenberg 2002, p.66–67). Thus, analyzing compositional data with OLS leads to biased
and inefficient estimates that can also lead to predicted values that cannot be observed in
reality, such as negative values or shares greater than one (Katz & King 1999).
Rather than analyzing separate estimations for each share of spending, I use Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regression (Jackson 2002; Tomz et al. 2002). The dependent variables
should be transformed as logged odds ratios of the quantity of interest in relation to a
baseline category (Jackson 2002). In this case, the dependent variables are the log of the
spending shares on each spending category over a baseline category













X2 0 0 . . . 0






















where ωJ = uJ + vJ . This means that the error term is composed of “the conventional
stochastic term in statistical models” (uJ ) and the “sampling error” (vJ ) (Jackson 2002,
p. 51). This accounts for the constraints imposed by compositional data in the variance-
covariance matrix, so the coefficient estimates obtained from this estimation are unbiased
and efficient.
Since I have data on up to ten (J = 10) different spending categories, I simultaneously
estimate up to nine (J −1) different equations. This is because the spending shares are ex-
pressed relative to a baseline category. As Philips and colleagues (2016) argue, analyses
of compositional data oftentimes only use one baseline category. However, an increase in
one category can come exclusively from a decrease in one other category or from a num-
ber of smaller decreases in several others (Philips et al. 2016). Right-wing governments
65
could spend more on security at the expense of redistribution only, for instance, as the
existing literature suggests. However, greater security spending could also come at the
expense of spending on redistribution and the environment, as I posit above, and/or any
other mix of the remaining spending categories. Thus, to asses the trade-offs between
different spending categories, in the following analyses, I estimate all models using each
category as the baseline once.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned above, existing research tends to analyze spending on individual cate-
gories in isolation and as a share of GDP. Moreover, the influence of left- or right-wing
parties in government is generally captured as the share of government seats or min-
isterial portfolios they control. Instead, I argue that parties can only implement their
preferred policies, and thereby increase spending on those areas, if they have significant
exit power. The left panels in Figures 1 and 2 plot left-wing (Figure 1) and redistributive
spending (Figure 2) as a share of total spending against the share of seats left-wing parties
control in government (Armingeon et al. 2015). In both panels, the share of government
seats left parties control ranges from zero – a government composed of at least one right-
wing party – to 100 – a government composed only of one or more left-wing parties. The
two left panels in Figures 1 and 2 show that spending on Left priorities and Redistribution
slightly increases in the share of government seats left-wing parties control. The magni-
tude of the increase, however, is small. The share of total spending spent on left-wing
priorities and redistribution is only slightly lower if no left-wing party is in government
compared to a government composed entirely of left-wing parties.
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Figure 3.1: Left Spending and Government Composition
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Left spending includes social protection, health, housing, and environment
In contrast, the panel on the right plots Left (Figure 1) and Redistributive spending
(Figure 2) as a share of total spending against the government’s ideological position. As
described above, this is calculated as a weighted average of parties’ individual ideological
position, using each party’s relative exit power as its weight. Governments in which right-
wing parties control great exit power relative to their partners have positive values. Sim-
ilarly, if left-wing parties control more exit power than their partners, governments are
placed farther to the left at negative values. Both figures show that government spending
on Left issues and Redistribution decreases in the governments ideological position, and
therefore, in right-wing parties’ exit power.
Similarly, Figure 3 plots government spending on national security (defense and pub-
lic order and safety) as a share of total spending. The left panel plots security spending
against the share of seats right-wing parties control in government (Armingeon et al.
2015), while the right panel plots it against the government’s exit power-weighted ideo-
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Figure 3.2: Redistributive Spending and Government Composition
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Redistributive spending includes social protection, health and housing
logical position. Security spending increases slightly as right-wing parties control more
seats in government, however, the difference in spending between a government in which
right-wing parties control no seats at all and one in which they control all is small. As
before, in the right panel, parties in which right-wing parties control greater exit power
are located on the right of the ideological dimension. In contrast to the plot in the left
panel, spending on security clearly increases in the exit power right-wing parties control
in government.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of governments’ ideological positions as well as
the more disaggregated spending categories. Across all countries in my sample, the mean
ideological position falls slightly left of center at −1.94. The most left-wing government
is placed at −36, while the most right-wing government has an ideological position of
32.21. Redistribution makes up the biggest share of total spending, ranging from 30 to
almost 64 percent, with a mean of just over half of total spending. Education comes in
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Figure 3.3: Security Spending and Government Composition
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Security spending includes defense and public order and safety
as the next biggest share of total spending. At the sample’s minimum, six percent of to-
tal spending is allocated to education, while this number increases to 20 percent at the
maximum. On average, countries spend twelve percent of total spending on education.
The mean spending on Economic Affairs takes up ten percent of total government expen-
ditures, ranging from four to 37 percent. Security spending, in contrast, ranges from
slighty below three percent to almost 15 percent, with a mean of 6.5 percent. The small-
est share of total spending is allocated to the Environment. On average, less than two
percent of total spending are allocated to environemtal protection, with the minimum at
almost 0.3 percent and the maximum at below four percent. General public services and
recreation and culture together take up almost 18 percent of total spending on average.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Government Ideology -1.94 13.11 -36 32.21 394
Redistribution 51.24 5.85 30.08 63.60 394
Education 12.42 2.52 6.05 19.93 394
Economic Affairs 10.46 3.40 4.07 37.03 394
Security 6.57 2.05 2.73 14.83 394
Environment 1.62 0.74 0.28 3.73 394
Other 17.69 4.27 9.31 29.33 394
3.5.2 Left vs. Right Spending
As described in the preceding section, I use seemingly unrelated regressions to test
the proposition derived above that spending on parties’ core policy areas increases in
their exit power. Following Philips and co-authors, I estimate several seemingly unre-
lated regressions using each category as the baseline to which spending is compared once
(Philips et al. 2016). All results from these estimations are reported in the appendix (Ap-
pendix 1 and 2). I use the government’s exit power-weighted mean ideological position
as the main explanatory variable. I first analyze spending trade-offs between broad left
and right spending categories before examining trade-offs between more disaggregated
spending categories.
Table 2 reports how spending on Left, Right, and Misc categories changes relative to
the same Left, Right, and Misc categories. Table 6 in Appendix 1 reports the coefficient
estimates for these estimations. Relative to right-wing spending priorities, a shift of the
government’s ideology to the right decreases spending on both Left and Misc spending
areas. This effect, however, only reaches statistical significance for the decrease in spend-
ing on Misc areas. Relative to spending on left-wing priorities, spending on right-wing
priorities increases as the government’s ideological positions moves farther to the right.
This effect reaches statistical significance at the ten percent level. In contrast, spending on
Misc categories decreases relative to left priorities, however, this effect is not statistically
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significant. Finally, relative to spending aggregated into the Misc category, spending on
both left- and right-wing priorities increases as right-wing parties have greater exit power
in government5. These results suggest that the trade-off between left- and right spending
holds to some extent, but it is not the only trade-off that can be observed.
The share of the population aged 65 and older increases spending on left-wing pri-
orities, while countries spend less on right-wing priorities after entering the Schengen
agreement. An increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in left
spending, and the effect of the share of the population aged 15 and below is inconsistent.
This first analysis of broad left and right suggests that the trade-offs governments face
when allocating money across spending areas are more complicated than the existing lit-
erature leads us to believe.




Relative to Misc + +
Right − −∗
Effect of shifting government’s ideological position to the right
Country set as Germany, Schengen held at one, remaining controls held at mean
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Since the coefficient estimates reported in Appendix 1 are hard to interpret, I calculate
the predicted spending shares for Left, Misc, and Right spending for the most left-wing
and the most right-wing government. I set the country as Germany after becoming a
member of the Schengen area, and hold the remaining control variables at their mean.
The predicted values are reported in Table 3 and are the average values obtained from
5The coefficients of the government’s ideological position on the share of spending allocated to left and
right priorities relative to left and right priorities are smaller and have bigger standard errors when estimat-
ing separate OLS models (results not reported here). The magnitude of the effects including miscellaneous
spending, on the other hand, are bigger.
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the estimations using Left, Right and Misc as the baseline, respectively (i.e. using all
estimation results reported in Appendix 1). In addition, I report the percentage change
in spending on Left, Right, and Misc priorities that can be observed when changing the
government’s position from the left- to the right-most ideological position.
I calculate the predicted spending share on Left, Right, and Misc spending priorities
as follows. As discussed in section 4.3, the dependent variables are the logged odds ratios
of spending shares over a baseline category. That is, using Right spending as the baseline,












= β02 + β12X2 (3.3)
To illustrate the findings, I change the government’s ideological position from its min-
imum to its maximum, setting the country as Germany, the Schengen dummy as one and
holding all remaining controls at their mean. I then exponentiate the predicted values
and receive from this
L
R
= exp(β01 + β11X1) = θ1 (3.4)
L = θ1 ×R (3.5)
M
R
= exp(β02 + β12X2) = θ2 (3.6)
M = θ2 ×R (3.7)
I can further use the fact that all shares sum to one to calculate the spending share of
the baseline category.
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(θ1 ×R) + (θ2 ×R) +R = 1 (3.8)
R =
1
θ1 +θ2 + 1
(3.9)
Lastly, I plug the result of equation (9) into equations (5) and (7) to calculate the
spending shares of left-wing and miscellaneous priorities. I do this for all estimations,
that is using Left, Right, and Misc as the baseline, thereby calculating three different pre-
dicted spending shares for each broad area. Table 3 reports the average of these.
Shifting the government’s ideological position from the sample minimum to the sam-
ple maximum leads to an increaes in spending on Left as well as Right priorities. The
percentage change for Right priorities, however, is 7.5 times larger than for Left priorities,
3.67 compared to 0.49, respectively. Spending on Misc areas decreases by 0.5 percentage
points, which corresponds to a percentage change of -1.29. This supports the proposition
derived above that, relative to all other spending areas, parties spend more on their prior-
ities as their exit power increases. As the level of aggregation is high, particularly for the
misc category, I discuss results from analyzing the allocation of government expenditures
across more disaggregated spending areas in the following section.
Table 3.3: Change in Government Ideology and Left, Misc, and Right Spending Priorities
Government Ideology Left Spending Misc Spending Right Spending
Minimum 54.89 % 38.85 % 6.26 %
Maximum 55.16 % 38.35 % 6.49 %
Percentage Change +0.49 −1.29 +3.67
Shift of Ideologly from sample minimum to maximum, controls held at mean
Country set at Germany, Schengen held at one
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3.5.3 Allocating Money Across Different Spending Areas
I now turn to analyzing how governments allocate limited spending across different
spending areas. Here, I analyze spending on the environment, redistribution, economic
affairs, education, security, and a residual other category. Table 4 reports the relationship
between these more disaggregated spending categories, while Tables 7 to 12 in Appendix
2 report the coefficient estimates of seemingly unrelated regressions using each category
as the baseline once. As described above, I expect security spending to increase relative
to spending on redistribution and the environment as right-wing parties’ exit power in-
creases.
Relative to Environment spending, a rightward shift in the government’s ideology in-
creases spending in all other spending areas. The effect does not reach statistical signif-
icance for the trade-off between environmental spending and expenditures on economic
affairs. All other effects are statistically significant at least at the five percent level. Com-
pared to redistributive spending, spending on education and security increases, while
spending on the environment and economic affairs decreases as right-wing parties con-
trol more exit power in government. Relative to economic spending, only environmental
spending decreases, while spending on all other areas increases. However, only the in-
crease in security spending reaches statistical significance at the five percent level. As
right-wing parties’ exit power increases, spending on the environment, redistribution,
and economic affairs decrease relative to education spending. In contrast, security spend-
ing increases. Finally, relative to security spending, the most right-wing spending prior-
ity, spending on all other categories decreases. However, only the negative effect on envi-
ronmental and economic spending are statistically significant at the one percent level6
These results suggest that education is, indeed, not a clear left-wing priority as govern-
6Using standard OLS models that do not account for dependencies across observations, the magnitude
of most of the coefficients of the ideological position increases. If the statistical significance changes, OLS
results reach significance where SUR results do not. The effect of the government’s ideological position on
spending on redistribution and economic affairs relative to security both decrease.
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ments in which right wing parties hold great exit power prioritize it over other spending
areas, including economic affairs. In contrast, economic affairs appears to be more of a
left-wing priority than other spending categories, including education.
Table 3.4: Effect of Government Ideology on Disaggregated Spending Priorities
Spending on
Environment Redistr. Econ. Affairs Education Security Other
Environment +∗∗ + +∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗
Redistr. −∗∗ − + + +
Relative Econ. Affairs − + + +∗∗ +∗
to Education −∗∗∗ − − + −
Security −∗∗∗ − −∗∗∗ − −
Other −∗∗∗ − −∗∗ − +
Effect of shifting government’s ideological position to the right
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Since the dependent variables are again logged odds ratios, the magnitude of the co-
efficients is hard to interpret. Thus, to illustrate the results, I again report spending
shares and the percentage changes in spending shares in Table 5. I follow the same steps
outlined in the previous section. As in Table 3, I report averages of the predicted val-
ues obtained from the estimations using each category as the baseline. Here, I illustrate
the results on Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Belgium has a small
standard deviation in governments’ ideological positions, and both the the minimum and
maximum ideological positions lie on the left of the dimension. In contrast, the standard
deviations in government ideology for Sweden and Germany are large. Different from
Belgium, Germany, and Sweden, the United Kingdom is characterized by single-party
majority governments. While the UK also exhibit a large standard deviation in govern-
ment ideology, governments tend to fall on the right of the ideological dimension. In fact,
the left-most UK government in the sample falls to the right of the right-most Belgian
government.
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Recall from Table 1 that spending on redistribution accounts for the biggest share in
the sample, with, on average, over half of all expenditures spent on redistribution. Gov-
ernments spend around ten percent of the budget on economic affairs and around twelve
percent on education. The mean of security spending lies at over six percent of all ex-
penditures, while environmental spending is by far the smallest share of spending, with
an average of under two percent. The four illustrative country cases in Table 5 show that
shifting the government’s ideological position from left to right increases spending on
redistribution, security, and education. This contradicts traditional ‘guns vs. butter’ ar-
guments, since greater spending on security is not financed by cutting welfare spending.
The examples reported in Table 5 also show that governments in which right-wing parties
have great exit power decrease spending on the environment and economic affairs. These
results lend support to the proposition that governing parties spend more on their policy
priorities relative to others as their exit power increases.
The result that governments spend more on redistribution as they control more exit
power might seem surprising at first, particularly given the traditional notion of ‘guns
vs. butter’, where spending increases in defense are financed by spending cuts in wel-
fare spending. However, this result confirms results from the existing literature on who
spends on different types of welfare spending (E. Huber et al. 1993). Huber, Ragin, and
Stephens find that Christian Democratic parties – which generally fall to the right of
the ideological dimension – spend more on direct transfers, particularly pensions, while
Social Democratic parties increase the size of the public sector (E. Huber et al. 1993). Re-
distribution as I am using it in these analyses includes direct transfers such as pensions
and survivor benefits, which biases the results against my expectation since right-wing
parties tend to increase direct transfers (E. Huber et al. 1993).
Only interpreting the change in shares of the budget spent on each area, however, is
not enough, since changes in those shares have very different effects depending on how
much is spent on each area to begin with. Moreover, SUR results capture exactly these
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relative changes in spending shares. Therefore, in the remainer of this discussion, I will
focus on percentage changes in spending shares since those account for how the baseline
spending changes with bargaining power distributions in government.
Table 3.5: Change in Government Ideology and Spending on Disaggregated Policy Areas
Government Ideology Environment Redistribution Econ. Affairs Education Security Other
Belgium
Country Min (-16.49) 1.47 % 51.48 % 10.42 % 12.37 % 6.23 % 18.02 %
Country Max (-6.72) 1.45 % 51.55 % 10.29 % 12.38 % 6.26 % 18.05 %
Percentage Change −1.36 +0.14 −1.25 +0.08 +0.48 +0.17
Germany
Country Min (-13.29) 1.55 % 53.19 % 9.84 % 11.75 % 6.33 % 17.34 %
Country Max (11.72) 1.49 % 53.37 % 9.52 % 11.80 % 6.40 % 17.41 %
Percentage Change −3.87 +0.34 −3.25 +0.43 +1.11 +0.40
Sweden
Country Min (-18.32) 1.17 % 52.44 % 9.83 % 12.80 % 6.32 % 17.44 %
Country Max (23.79) 1.10 % 52.72 % 9.31 % 12.88 % 6.44 % 17.55 %
Percentage Change −5.98 +0.53 −5.29 +0.63 +1.90 +0.63
United Kingdom
Country Min (-3.09) 1.58 % 52.80 % 8.24 % 12.61 % 7.34 % 17.43 %
Country Max (30.47) 1.50 % 52.99 % 7.88 % 12.67 % 7.45 % 17.50 %
Percentage Change −5.06 +0.36 −4.37 +0.48 +1.50 +0.40
Controls held at mean, Schengen held at one for Belgium, Germany, and Sweden
In all four countries, powerful right-wing parties increase the percentage of education
and redistributive spending by less than one percent. In contrast, the same change in
right-wing parties’ exit power leads to a percentage increase in national security spend-
ing that is about three times larger than the increase in redistribution and lies over one
percent in Germany, Sweden, and the UK. In Germany, the difference in percentage in-
creases between redistribution and national security is the smallest, with the percentage
change in national security spending slightly more than 3 times the change in redistribu-
tive spending. In Dollar amounts, this translates to 2 billion Dollars more spent on redis-
tribution and 850 million Dollars spent more on national security. In the UK, in contrast,
the difference is largest. Here, the percentage change in national security spending (1.5)
is over four times the percentage increase in spending on redistribution (0.36). Trans-
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lating this into Dollar amounts, redistributive spending increaess by 1.5 billion Dollars
and security spending increases by 800 million Dollars. In both Sweden and Belgium,
the percentage increase in total money spent on security is around 3.5 times the increase
in redistributive spending. This supports the proposition derived above that, relative to
other spending areas, government parties spend more on their priorities as they control
greater exit power.
The differences in percentage increases in expenditure shares spent on national secu-
rity and education vary more across the four cases. In Germany, the difference is small-
est, with national security spending increasing just over 2.5 times more than education
spending. This difference is reflected in the Dollar amount by which spending on each
area increases. Compared to the 850 million Dollar increase in national security spend-
ing, education spending increases by 550 million Dollars. In contrast, in Belgium the
percentage increase in security spending is six times the percentage increase in education
spending. Again, this difference shows up in Dollar terms as spending on education in-
creases by 33 million Dollars compared to 46 million Dollars, by which security spending
increases. These results show that, compared to other spending areas, right-wing parties
increase security spending by more as they control greater exit power. This supports my
expectation about how parties make decisions about allocating a finite amount of money
across several spending priorities.
As described above, governments decrease the share of the total budget allocated to
the environment and economic affairs as right-wing parties control greater exit power. In
all four cases, the percentage decreases in spending on the environment and economic
affairs are greater than the percentage increase in any other area, ranging from 1.25 to al-
most six. In Belgium, for instance, the absolute percentage decrease on economic spend-
ing is 2.6 times larger than the increase in security spending. Calculating Dollar changes,
spending on economic affairs decreases by 200 million Dollars, while security spending
increases by 33 million. In Germany and the UK, this ratio increases to 2.9, while the
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right-most government in Sweden decreases economic spending 2.8 times more than it
increases security spending. In Sweden, this means that spending on economic affairs
decreases by over 800 million Dollars, while security spending increases by almost 200
million Dollars.
In terms of percentage changes, environmental spending exhibits the greatest changes
of all spending areas. Since spending on the environment receives the smallest share of
the total budget, even small changes in money allocated to this area have significant ef-
fects. In Belgium, environmental spending is cut by 34 million Dollars (1.36 percent-
age points) and security spending receives 46 million Dollars more as right-wing parties
control greater exit power. Despite these similar Dollar amounts, the change in environ-
mental spending is 2.7 times that of the change in security spending. In Germany, a shift
from the country’s left-most government to the right-most one decreases environmental
spending by 650 million Dollars. Even though the same shift increases security spending
by 850 million Dollars, the percentage change in environmental spending is 3.5 times
larger than the change in security spending. Sweden and the UK fall in between Belgium
and Germany, with spending on the environment decreasing 3.1 and 3.4 times more than
security spending increases. These results show that, as their exit power increases, gov-
ernment parties spend less on spending areas that do not reflect their policy priorities. In
fact, as right-wing parties control greater exit power in government they decrease spend-
ing on the environment and economic affairs considerably, indeed much more so, than
they increase spending on national security, education, and redistribution.
To summarize, analyzing more disaggregated spending categories simultaneously sup-
ports the proposition that, as a party’s exit power increases, it is able to spend more on its
policy priorities relative to other spending areas. Interpreting changes in the allocation
of spending across different areas, it is important to account for differences in the relative
increase and decrease in spending across areas. That is, rather than analyzing whether or
not areas receive a greater share of expenditures, it is important to examine percentage
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changes within and across spending areas. While redistributive spending, for instance,
increases in right-wing parties’ exit power, it increases by less than security spending.
In fact, security spending increases about three times more than spending on redistribu-
tion. This is because the share of the budget spent on redistribution is vastly greater than
the share spent on security. At the other extreme, since environmental spending receives
the smallest share of expenditures, small changes have great relative effects. Indeed,
the percentage change in environmental spending is largest, with governments spending
considerably less on the enivronment if right-wing parties are powerful. The percent-
age change is 2.7 to 3.5 times larger than the increase in security spending, which itself
has the greatest percentage increase among those spending areas that receive more money
from right-wing parties. These results support my expectation that, relative to redistribu-
tive and environmental spending, security spending increases in right-wing parties’ exit
power; and that relative to security spending, redistributive and environmental spending
decreases in right-wing parties’ exit power.
3.6 Robustness Checks
I now turn to discussing robustness checks. Appendix 3 reports the estimation results
for the first set of robustness checks, in which I analyze the budget composition using
the fully disaggregated ten spending categories. I expect spending on defense and pub-
lic order to increase relative to other spending categories as right-wing parties control
greater exit power. Similarly, I expect spending on the environment, social protection,
housing, and health to decrease relative to other categories in right-wing parties’ bar-
gaining power. As before, I remain agnostic about the effect of right-wing parties exit
power on economic affairs, education, public services, and recreation and culture. Let
me first turn to those categories grouped into the Left category above. Relative to all
other categories, the government’s ideological position has a negative effect on environ-
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mental spending. Relative to spending on housing, only defense spending increases as
right-wing parties control greater exit power. Relative to health spending, spending on
the environment, social protection, economic affairs, and public services decreases, while
spending on housing, education, public order, defense, and recreation increases. These
results suggest that, among the Left priorities, right-wing parties place greater emphasis
on housing than on social protection, health, and environmental spending.
Relative to spending on economic affairs, governments increase spending on all other
spending categories except the environment as right-wing parties hold greater exit power.
This further suggests that economic affairs is a more left-wing rather than a right-wing
spending priority. Relative to education spending, governments decrease spending on
the environment, social protection, economic affairs, public order, public services, and
recreation as right-wing parties hold greater bargaining power. In contrast, spending on
housing, health, and defense increases. This suggests that education is more of a right-
wing spending priority than a left-wing priority.
Relative to spending on public order, spending on the environment, economic affairs,
public services, and recreation decreases in right-wing parties’ exit power. In contrast,
spending on social protection, housing, health, education, and defense increases. Finally,
relative to defense spending, right-wing parties decrease spending on all other categories
as they control more exit power. This suggests that among Right spending areas, right-
wing parties prioritize defense spending over spending on public order and safety. Thus,
these additional analyses further support the proposition that government parties in-
crease spending on their priorities relative to other categories as they control greater exit
power.
Second, I estimate seemingly unrelated regressions on a number of different samples
(results not reported). The main analyses discussed above are restricted to parliamentary
systems and semi-presidential systems in which the parliament dominates. As an addi-
tional robustness check, I estimate all models reported above on all systems as well as
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strictly parliamentary systems only. Not restricting the political system to those clearly
dominated by the parliament, Left and Misc spending both still descrease relative to Right
spending as right-wing parties control greater exit power in government.
In the same extended sample, relative to environmental spending, spending on all
other areas increases in the exit power of right-wing parties. Similarly, relative to spend-
ing on redistribution, environmental and economic spending decrease, while education,
security, and other spending increases in the bargaining power of right-wing government
parties. As before, relative to security spending, spending on all other areas decreases.
Finally, as in the main analyses, the results using economic affairs and education as base-
lines suggest that education is more of a right-wing priority than economic affairs. In all
models, the magnitude of most effects slightly decreases compared to the main results
discussed above, however, the direction and statistical significance remain the same as in
the main analyses. These results lend further support to the main proposition derived
above.
Restricting the sample to strictly parliamentary systems increases the magnitude of
the effect of the government’s ideology on the composition of the budget, particularly for
the coefficients on left- and right-wing spending priorities. Relative to Right spending,
Left and Misc spending priorities still decrease in the exit power of right-wing parties.
Relative to Left spending, Right spending increases as right-wing parties control greater
exit power. Moreover, relative to Left spending, Misc spending decreases in right-wing
parties’ bargaining power. Finally, relative to Misc spending, Left and Right spending still
increase in the exit power of right-wing parties in government.
Turning to more disaggregated categories, the magnitude of the coefficients does not
uniformly increase or decrease compared to the main analyses, however, the direction of
the effect of right-wing parties’ exit power all remain the same. Relative to environmen-
tal spending, spending on all policy areas increases in right-wing parties’ exit power. As
above, spending on the environment and economic affairs decreases relative to redistri-
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bution, while spending on education and security increases as right-wing parties control
greater exit power. Relative to security spending, governments spend less on all other
spending areas as right-wing parties control greater exit power. Again, using education
and economic affairs as the baseline suggests that education is a more right-wing priority
than economic affairs. Restricting the sample of governments to those in office in strictly
parliamentary systems lends stronger support to the proposition derived above that par-
ties increase spending on their priorities relative to others as their relative exit power
increases.
The results do not change if I exclude Eastern and Central European countries from
the sample, either (results not reported here). All of these different analyses support the
proposition that government parties increase spending on their priorities relative to oth-
ers as their relative exit power increases. This suggests that, once in government, parties
indeed seek to implement policies that will increase their re-election chances. However,
as these analyses demonstrate, not every government party is equally able to do so. In-
stead, government parties that can credibly threaten to exit the incumbent government
because they can enter at least one other alternative government that is likely to form and
ideologically attractive are better able to implement their policy priorities and thereby in-
crease spending on these areas.
3.7 Conclusion
To summarize, in this chapter, I find that parties increase spending on their policy
priorities relative to other areas if they have great exit power. All parties have the in-
centive to implement their core policies once in office. Doing so enables them to claim
credit for delivering policies to their constituents, which increases their chances of being
re-elected. Not being able to implement policy promises runs the risk of losing votes in
the next general election and ultimately losing office. However, while all parties have the
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incentive, I argue that not all of them have the ability to do so. Parties can only implement
their policy priorities if they have great exit power in government. Parties have great exit
power if they can credibly threaten to exit the incumbent government. I argue that par-
ties can only do so if they can enter at least one alternative goverment that is both likely
to form and ideologically attractive. The greater the expected utility of parties’ outside
options, the more exit power they control. Regarding the composition of the budget, gov-
erning parties’ ability to spend more on their core policy areas increases in their relative
exit power.
I use an original measure of governing parties’ exit power that captures how likely
their outside options are to form and how attractive they are ideologically. In addition,
I estimate spending on different categories simultaneously. I use spending on ten cate-
gories and aggregate them into broader spending areas. This allows me to examine trade-
offs between spending areas more closely, i.e. where additional money to fund spending
increases comes from and where money freed up through descreased spending is used
instead. I use seemingly unrelated regressions to account for the fact that all spending
shares sum up to one and to account for dependencies across categories.
I find that, relative to other spending areas, parties spend more on their policy prior-
ities as they hold greater relative exit power. More specifically, I show that spending on
Left and Right issues both increase in right-wing parties’ exit power. However, the per-
centage increase in spending on Right issues is much greater than the percentage increase
in spending on Left issues. In Germany, changing right-wing parties’ exit power from
the minimum to the maximum increases right-wing spending 7.5 times more than left
spending.
Shifting a government’s ideological position from its minimum on the left to its max-
imum on the right leads to an increase in security, redistributive, and education spend-
ing. The percentage increases are smallest for redistribution and education spending and
largest for national security spending. Security spending grows three times more than
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redistributive spending, while security spending increases 2.5 to six times more than ed-
ucation spending if right-wing parties control great relative exit power in government. In
contrast, increasing right-wing parties’ exit power in government decreases spending on
the environment and economic affairs. The percentage change in spending on economic
affairs is almost three times larger than the change in national security spending. Sim-
ilarly, environmental spending is decreased by 2.7 to 3.5 times the increase in security
spending.
All these results support my expectation that governing parties increase spending
on their core policies relative to other spending areas as they control greater exit power.
The analyses show that, as right-wing parties’ exit power increases, governments increase
spending on national security by much more than they increase redistribution and edu-
cation spending. The results also show that, in fact, governing parties tend to decrease
spending on areas that are not their core priorities by much more than they increase
spending on their priorities if they have the ability to do so. As right-wing parties’ exit
power increases, spending on the environment and economic affairs decreases by much
more than security spending increases. These results illustrate that analyzing budget
items simultaneously is important to tease out the trade-offs governing parties make
when allocating money. Moreover, results need to be interpreted with an eye toward
the baseline level of spending each area receives. Percentage and monetary increases in
spending have a very different meaning depending on the baseline amount of spending
to which money is added or subtracted.
This chapter furthers our understanding of how governments make decisions once
they are in office and under what conditions parties can implement their policy programs
after entering office. It allows us to look insight the black box of multi-party policy-
making. Parties’ strategic position in the government formation game plays a crucial
role during policy-making once in office since governments implement policies under
the threat of a new round of government negotiations and thus in the shadow of other
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potential governments that could enter office. Moreover, I show that parties’ bargainig
leverage in government is crucial to explaining which policy areas receive more funding
and where those additional funds come from. This provides insights into the trade-offs
parties are willing to make when allocating money across different spending areas.
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3.8 Appendix 2: Broad Left/Right Spending Categories
Here, I report the coefficient estimates of three separate seemingly unrelated regres-
sion analyses. For the first two columns, Right spending is used as the baseline spending
category; in the third and fourth, Left is used as the baseline; and in the last two columns,
Misc is used as the baselind category. All coefficients report changes in one spending cat-
egory relative to the baseline, and all analyses include country-fixed effects.
Table 3.6: Exit Power and Budget Composition
Spending on Left Misc Right Misc Left Right
Relative to Right Left Misc
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.000356 -0.000715∗ 0.000451∗ -0.000138 0.000161 0.000671
(0.000268) (0.000419) (0.000267) (0.000406) (0.000384) (0.000409)
Real GDP Growtht−1 -0.00334∗∗∗ -0.00221 0.00275∗∗∗ 0.00289∗∗ -0.00247∗ 0.00131
(0.000984) (0.00149) (0.000991) (0.00144) (0.00140) (0.00151)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.00246∗∗ -0.00161
(0.000991) (0.00114)
Population Over 65t−1 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00277) (0.00338)










Constant 0.317∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.0854 -0.620∗∗∗
(0.0600) (0.100) (0.0570) (0.0815) (0.0590) (0.0630)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.9 Appendix 3: Disaggregated Spending Categories
In this Appendix, I report coefficient estimates of seemingly unrelated regressions of
the government budget composition using environment, redistribution, economic affairs,
education, security, and other spending as the baseline category once.
Table 3.7: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Environment
Spending on
Redistribution Economic Affairs Education Security Other
Government Ideologyt−1 0.00145∗∗ 0.000966 0.00149∗∗ 0.00175∗∗∗ 0.00132∗∗
(0.000588) (0.00104) (0.000585) (0.000630) (0.000673)
Real GDP Growtht−1 -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.00831∗∗ -0.00677∗∗∗ -0.00715∗∗∗ -0.00892∗∗∗
(0.00213) (0.00375) (0.00211) (0.00228) (0.00242)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.00159∗
(0.000881)
Population Over 65t−1 0.00851∗∗∗
(0.00226)














Constant 1.049∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗
(0.0879) (0.111) (0.0719) (0.0524) (0.0624)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Redistribution
Spending on
Environment Economic Affairs Education Security Other
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.00153∗∗ -0.00110 0.0000718 0.000391 0.0000235
(0.000597) (0.000913) (0.000214) (0.000269) (0.000306)
Real GDP Growtht−1 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.00465 0.00379∗∗∗ 0.00294∗∗∗ 0.000537
(0.00216) (0.00332) (0.000777) (0.000994) (0.00112)














Constant -1.555∗∗∗ -1.064∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.0932) (0.0563) (0.0530) (0.0269)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Economic Affairs
Spending on
Environment Redistribution Education Security Other
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.000392 0.00136 0.00136 0.00185∗∗ 0.00163∗
(0.00103) (0.000889) (0.000886) (0.000876) (0.000983)
Real GDP Growtht−1 0.00696∗ -0.00422 -0.000431 -0.000295 -0.00253
(0.00374) (0.00323) (0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00358)
BUnemployment Ratet−1 -0.000545
(0.00106)
Population Over 65t−1 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.00303)














Constant -0.911∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ -0.0709∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.0886) (0.0701) (0.0596) (0.0422) (0.0491)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Education
Spending on
Environment Redistribution Economic Affairs Security Other
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.00178∗∗∗ -0.0000211 -0.00134 0.000269 -0.000123
(0.000598) (0.000210) (0.000883) (0.000251) (0.000318)
Real GDP Growtht−1 0.00683∗∗∗ -0.00392∗∗∗ -0.00146 -0.000628 -0.00278∗∗
(0.00214) (0.000774) (0.00322) (0.000918) (0.00114)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.00198∗∗∗
(0.000763)














Constant -1.113∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ 0.0255
(0.108) (0.0451) (0.0462) (0.0205) (0.0157)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Security
Spending on
Environment Redistribution Economic Affairs Education Other
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.00213∗∗∗ -0.000366 -0.00257∗∗∗ -0.000296 -0.000346
(0.000643) (0.000268) (0.000881) (0.000253) (0.000350)
Real GDP Growtht−1 0.00648∗∗∗ -0.00369∗∗∗ -0.00382 0.000253 -0.00235∗
(0.00228) (0.000979) (0.00322) (0.000899) (0.00127)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.00227∗∗∗
(0.000756)
Population Over 65t−1 0.00837∗∗∗
(0.00210)












Constant -0.694∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0749) (0.0471) (0.0433) (0.0422) (0.0294)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.12: Exit Power and Budget Composition: Baseline Other
Spending on
Environment Redistribution Economic Affairs Education Security
Government Ideologyt−1 -0.00178∗∗∗ -0.0000544 -0.00230∗∗ -0.0000894 0.000131
(0.000683) (0.000288) (0.000989) (0.000318) (0.000352)
Real GDP Growtht−1 0.00852∗∗∗ -0.00128 -0.000310 0.00230∗∗ 0.00163
(0.00242) (0.00106) (0.00361) (0.00114) (0.00129)
Unemployment Ratet−1 -0.00283∗∗∗
(0.000824)
Population Over 65t−1 0.00624∗∗∗
(0.00225)














Constant -0.867∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.0198 -0.224∗∗∗
(0.0885) (0.0400) (0.0554) (0.0371) (0.0284)
Observations 394 394 394 394 394
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.10 Appendix 4: All Individual Spending Categories
In this Appendix, I report results of seemingly unrelated regressions using all ten
individual spending categories without aggregating them. I report the results of using
all categories as the baseline once, with the exception of social protection. Using social
protection as the baseline category does not allow me to analyze the composition of the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Beyond Gamson’s Law: Parties’ Exit Power and Portfolio
Allocation in Multiparty Governments
4.1 Introduction
Why do some government parties receive more, and more important, ministerial port-
folios than others? Allocating available portfolios among a set of potential government
partners is a crucial step in coalition negotitations, often presented as on par with sub-
stantive questions and agreeing on a policy agenda (Zeit Online October 24, 2013, for
an example covering the German 2013 general election). Consequently, the portfolios a
party secures can be interpreted as the most immediate manifestation of the bargaining
leverage it holds over its partners.
The existing literature posits that parties’ governing power derives from one of two
sources, their size or control of the agenda. Thus, concerning the number of portfolios
parties receive, extant research can be divided into two groups. The first argues that par-
ties receive a share of portfolios that is proportional to the share of seats they contribute
to the government’s majority (Gamson 1961). The second posits that parties that have
agenda-setting power are over-compensated and receive a greater share of portfolios than
their partners (Baron & Ferejohn 1989). Here, agenda-setting power refers to the fact that
formateurs have the first move in the government formation game. Concerning the type
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of ministries received, Laver and Shepsle argue that parties are more likely to receive a
ministry if they hold the median ideological position on the dimension associated with
that particular ministry (Laver & Shepsle 1996). In addition, the party family each party
belongs to has been found to explain which ministries parties receive (Bäck, Debus, &
Dumont 2001).
I introduce a more general source of bargaining power that is in line with insights from
classic bargaining models (Rubinstein 1982). I argue that a governing party’s bargaining
power is determined by the credibility of its exit threat. Parties can credibly threaten to
abandon negotiations over a potential government if they can enter negotiations over at
least one alternative government that is likely to form and ideologically attractive. As
such, I expect parties to receive more, and more important, portfolios, the greater their
exit power.
Most accounts of government formation and ministerial portfolio allocation assume
all portfolios to be equally valuable. Laver and Hunt (1992) and more recently Druck-
man and Warwick (2005) and Warwick and Druckman (2006), however, show that this
is not the case. Certain portfolios are more salient than others and consistently ranked
higher than others across all countries, but the salience ranking of portfolios also differs
considerably across countries. In this chapter, I use their findings to weight individual
portfolios by their salience.
In addition, existing accounts of ministerial portfolio allocation share one method-
ological shortcoming. While the outcome of interest is the share of portfolios received
by each government party, they do not explicitly model the compositional character of
the data even though Katz and King explicitly mention the allocation of portfolios across
government parties as an example of compositional data (Katz & King 1999, p. 19). With
a limited number of portfolios available, an increase in one party’s share of portfolios
decreases the share of portfolios that can be allocated across the remaining government
parties. Moreover, the shares of all government parties add up to one. Not modeling
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dependencies across observations, however, leads to biased and inefficient results.
In this chapter, I use a new measure of parties’ exit power that is comparable across
countries and over time. This measure is based on the simulation of around 120,000
potential governments and an estimation of their likelihood of entering office and their
attractiveness to each potential member. I compute this measure for all parties that en-
tered government at least once during the postwar era in advanced democracies. In addi-
tion, I model the dependent variable as compositional and estimate the salience-weighted
share of portfolios simultaneously for all coalition partners. However, since the number
of parties in office is not constant for all governments, the number of equations to be
estimated is not constant across observations, either. Here, I use two approaches to intro-
duce dependencies across observations. First, I estimate seemingly unrelated regressions
on subsets of coalitions where the number of government parties is held constant. Sec-
ond, I use a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model to analyze the allocation of
portfolios on the full pooled sample of observations (Liang & Zeger 1986; Zeger & Liang
1986). I find some support for the claim that parties that can credibly threaten to aban-
don negotiations receive more, and more important, portfolios than their partners.
In the next section, I give a brief overview of the literature on ministerial portfolio
allocation. Next, I present my argument about the source of parties’ bargaining power.
In the following section, I describe the methods and data used to test my expectation
of the effect of exit power on the share of salience-weighted portfolios parties receive. I
report results of my empirical analyses in the penultimate section and conclude with a
discussion in the final section.
4.2 Portfolio Allocation
In addition to negotiating substantive issues during coalition negotiations, dividing
the finite set of portfolios between future coalition partners is crucial. Extant research on
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the allocation of ministerial portfolios across government parties focuses on the number
of portfolios as well as which portfolios a party is likely to receive. In this section, I will
provide a brief overview of research falling into both categories.
Concerning the question which pary receives which ministry, parties’ ideological po-
sitions are found to be the most important determinant. Laver and Shepsle argue that
government parties that are located at the median of an ideological dimension are most
likely to receive the ministry associated with this dimension (Laver & Shepsle 1996). Sim-
ilarly, Bäck and her co-authors find that the party family each government party belongs
to affects which portfolios it is likely to obtain (Bäck et al. 2001). This is because these
parties share similar policy goals and tend to value portfolios associated with these policy
areas more than others. Social Democratic parties, for instance, are more likely to receive
the Ministry of Labor and of Social Affairs, ceteris paribus, while Green parties are ex-
pected to receive the Ministry of Environment when in government (Bäck et al. 2001).
However, the same ministry can be associated with more than one party family: Social
Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Conservative parties, for instance, all tend to re-
ceive the Ministry of Social Affairs when in office (Bäck et al. 2001). Thus, the party family
to which each party belongs alone cannot fully explain why some parties receive certain
ministries and not others. Finally, Brams and Kaplan (2004) and O’Leary, Grofman, and
Elklit (2005) show that differences in the rules governing the sequence with which parties
choose ministries can alter which specific portfolios parties choose at which point in the
bargaining process, and if they receive their most-preferred post at all.
Research on the question of how many portfolios government parties receive can be
broadly divided into two strands. One strand argues that parties’ bargaining power de-
rives from their size, while the second argues that their bargaining power derives from
their agenda-setting power. Gamson falls into the first category and conceptualizes bar-
gaining power in terms of parties’ size in government seats, such that parties receive
more portfolios the more seats they contribute to the governments parliamentary ma-
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jority (Gamson 1961). He famously argues that government parties receive a share of
ministries that is proportional to their share of government seats (Gamson 1961). The
empirical evidence is overwhelmingly supportive of this hypothesis, so it is widely known
as ‘Gamson’s Law’. Druckman and Roberts (2005), for instance, find support in the East-
ern European context, and Warwick and Druckman (2006) show that this proposition is
still supported when portfolios are weighted by their salience. Extending the application
to intra-party politics, Mershon finds support that, for factions in the Italian Christian
Democratic Party, “the share of seats held by the faction on the DC National Council” has
a positive effect on the share of portfolios they receive, with the regression coefficient at
0.77 (Mershon 2001, p. 286).
Studies that fall into the second strand of research are mostly formal models of gov-
ernment formation which posit that one coalition party tends to be overcompensated in
terms of ministries because it has greater bargaining power than its partners. One source
of such over-compensation is the extent to which a party has agenda-setting power. Con-
trolling the agenda during coalition negotitations, formateur parties are able to offer their
potential coalition partners a division of ministries that favors them (Baron & Ferejohn
1989). In addition to the number of portfolios the formateur can claim for itself, Baron
and Ferejohn argue that the formateur party is most likely to receive the most impor-
tant portfolios, most notably the Prime Ministership (Baron & Ferejohn 1989). Lacking
agenda-settig power, potential partners cannot counter the formateur’s offer but can only
agree or walk away from it, waiting for the status of formateur to be conferred to them
in case no agreement is reached in this stage (Baron & Ferejohn 1989). Thus, parties with
agenda-power are expected to receive a greater share of portfolios, and particularly im-
portant ones, than their partners. This share is also greater than their share of voting
weights would suggest. Following the setup of formal models closely and using parties’
voting weights rather than seat shares, Ansolabehere and his co-authors find that this
proposition in supported (Ansolabehere et al. 2005).
108
Addressing deviations from proportionality, Ono finds that the Prime Minister’s party
in fact receives fewer ministries than Gamson’s (1961) and Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989)
arguments lead us to expect (Ono 2010). He argues that concerns of government survival
and policy-making lead prime ministerial parties to accept a smaller share of portfolios.
Smaller parties are overcompensated by the formateur to keep them in office (Ono 2010).
In addition, endogenizing both formateur choice and government formation, Bassi finds
that parties only receive a share of portfolios that is proportional to their seat shares if
coalition partners have the same or entirely orthogonal preferences over portfolios (Bassi
2013). However, the allocation is not proportional if one party prefers one portfolio more
than the others, such that “the more skewed party i’s preference is, the less than propor-
tional is the share of portfolio [sic] that party i is allocated in equilibrium” (Bassi 2013,
p. 787).
Finally, not all portfolios are equally attractive to all parties (Bassi 2013), and not all
portfolios are ranked the same across countries. Prime Ministership, Finance, Foreign Af-
fairs, and Interior are consistently ranked as the most important and attractive ministries
(Laver & Hunt 1992), however, the exact ranking of portfolios and the values attached
to them differ across countries (Druckman & Warwick 2005). Druckman and Warwick
(2005) provide salience rankings of all porfolios in Western Europe based on an expert
survey. Warwick and Druckman (2006) find that government party’s receive a greater
share of salience-weighted portfolios, the greater their share of government seats.
While formal models such as the one by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model the prob-
ability of being awarded the formateur status as equal across all parliamentary parties,
the party controlling the largest share of seats in the newly elected parliament is gener-
ally awarded the status of formateur. Moreover, the chances of receiving the position of
formateur increase if the party held the Prime Ministership in the outgoing government.
That is, while theoretically any party could be the formateur, in fact the formateur status
is closely related to size in terms of seat shares as well. Thus, the effect of formateur sta-
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tus on receiving portfolios cannot easily be distinguished from the effect of parties’ size
in terms of seats.
In contrast to the existing literature, I argue that the extent to which a party can credi-
bly threaten to abandon coalition negotiations and enter another government determines
their bargaining power and thereby how many important portfolios a party receives. That
is, I expect parties to receive more, and more important, portfolios, the greater the credi-
bility of their exit threats is. I explain this argument in the next section. One shortcoming
of existing empirical accounts of portolio allocation is that the dependent variable is not
modeled as compositional, which leads to inefficient and biased results. I will discuss
this in more detail in section 4.
4.3 Exit Power and the Allocation of Ministerial Portfolios
Formal bargaining models sshare the notion that bargaining power derives from ac-
tors’ next best options in case of a bargaining breakdown. The existing literature posits
that parties have great bargaining power if they control the agenda when bargaining over
a new government (Baron & Ferejohn 1989), or if they control many seats (Gamson 1961).
All of these arguments, however, assume that the cost of exiting a government is equal
across its members. In contrast, I argue that the costs of bringing down a government are
not equal for all governing parties. Coalition negotiations over a specific potential gov-
ernment take place in light of other governments that could form in the event of such a
bargaining failure. Parties that can credibly threaten to walk away from negotiations, i.e.
bring down the current round of bargaining, without foregoing the chance of entering
office have great Exit Power. Such threats, however, are only credible if they can enter ne-
gotiations over at least one alternative government that is likely to form and ideologically
appealing.
A rich literature on government formation has found that a number of factors affect
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how likely different governments are to enter office. A government is more likely to en-
ter office, the more similar its coalition parties’ ideological positions are (Axelrod 1970;
De Swaan 1973) and the fewer parties it comprises (Riker 1962), thereby minimizing the
costs of governing by making it it easier to find compromises. The government’s likeli-
hood of entering office is constant across all governing parties. The ideological appeal of
each government, on the other hand, differs across coalition parties. For each potential
member, the attractiveness of each government is inversely related to the distance be-
tween the member’s and the government’s overall ideological position. The closer each
member’s ideal position is to the government’s ideological position, the more likely it is
that the government’s policies will be close to the member’s policy preferences. Taken
together, alternative governments are of greater expected utility, the more likely they are
to form and the more attractive they are ideologically.
Therefore, government parties that can enter at least one alternative government of
great expected utility can credibly threaten to bring about a bargaining failure by aban-
doning coalition negotiations. However, the availability of outside options alone does
not determine parties’ bargaining power. Rather, bargaining power is inherently relative,
so each coalition member’s bargaining power is determined by the credibility of its exit
threats relative to the credibility of its partners’ threats. As such, parties can only take ad-
vantage of invoking their outside options if their partners lack the ability to do so. Those
parties that can credibly threaten to abandon negotiations over coalitions can reap the
benefits and receive concessions if their partners cannot enter alternative governments
that are likely to form and ideologically attractive. Instead, such weak parties are willing
to grant concessions to be able to enter government in the first place.
While this expectation applies to all types of concessions, in this chapter, I specifically
focus on ministerial concessions rather than policy concessions. As described above, re-
garding the allocation of portfolios, both the number of ministries parties receive and
their salience are important. If only one government party can credibly threaten to exit
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the government because it controls all relative exit power, it receives all portfolios, in-
cluding all the most important ones. At the other extreme, if a party is constrained to
the one government currently being negotiated, it does not have any viable and attrac-
tive alternative governments it can enter. As such, it cannot credibly threaten to abandon
negotiations and will grant its partner(s) all portfolios, including all important ones, to
be able to enter office at all. In between these two extremes, I expect a governing party’s
share of portfolios and their importance to increase in the party’s relative Exit Power.
Proposition. Government parties receive more, and more salient, ministerial portfolios, the
more relative exit power they control.
4.4 Method and Data
4.4.1 Methodological Issues and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
In this section, I describe the methodological issues that arise from analyzing the al-
location of ministerial porfolios. As briefly mentioned above, the existing empirical liter-
ature analyzing how portfolios are allocated across coalition partners does not model the
dependent variable – the share of portfolios each government party receives – appropri-
ately. Portfolio shares are compositional as a finite set of portfolios is divided between a
number of actors1. Thus, the portfolio shares of all coalition parties add up to one. More-
over, one party receiving a greater share of portfolios means that there are fewer left to
be distributed to its partners. That is, an increase in one share leads to a decrease in the
remaining share(s).
Using standard OLS to analyze compositional data, however, leads to a number of
problems since doing so imposes assumptions on the data structure that are not borne out
1Katz and King explicitly mention ministerial portfolios as an example of compositional data that should
be modeled as such (Katz & King 1999, p. 19)
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by the data. “First, OLS assumes that the dependent variable is theoretically unbounded
and could fall anywhere on the real number line, whereas in reality each [party’s] share
[...] must lie between 0 and 1. Second, OLS treats [...] each [share] independently, but
they are not independent because the proportions for all parties must sum to 1” (Tomz et
al. 2002, p. 66–67). Using OLS to analyze compositional data leads to biased and ineffi-
cient estimates (Katz & King 1999). Moreover, using such estimates to generate predicted
values can lead to values that cannot be observed, including negative shares or shares
greater than one (Katz & King 1999).
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) can be used to analyze compositional data
while explicitly accounting for dependencies across observations (Jackson 2002; Tomz et
al. 2002). Here, I analyze several equations simultaneously, so I have one dependent vari-
able for each coalition party (for a maximum of six dependent variables) rather than one
containing the portfolio shares of all parties. Similarly, I have several explanatory vari-
ables containing the obervations for each party in government, again up to six each. The
dependent variables are transformed into logged odds ratios of the quantity of interest in
relation to a baseline category (Jackson 2002). For this analysis, the dependent variables
are the log of each party’s portfolio shares over the portfolio share of a baseline party:
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where ωJ = uJ + vJ , so the error term is composed of “the conventional stochastic term in
statistical models” (uJ ) and the “sampling error” (vJ ) (Jackson 2002, p. 51). This accounts
for the constraints imposed by compositional data in the variance-covariance matrix, so
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the coefficient estimates obtained from this estimation are unbiased and efficient. I es-
timate several models using each party’s portfolio share as the baseline category once to
be able to examine if increases in one party’s share of portfolios come exclusively at the
expense of another one or are shared by several of its partners (Philips et al. 2016).
While portfolio shares of coalition members are compositional, the data structure is
irregular and unbalanced such that seemingly unrelated regressions cannot be applied
without added complications, either. Here, the dependent variables are the shares of
salience-weighted portfolios government parties receive when they enter office. How-
ever, the number of parties in government is not equal for all governments. This means
that the number of equations to be estimated simultaneously is not constant across ob-
servations, either. Rather, it ranges from two in all two-party coalitions to six for the
six-party coalitions in my sample.
Attempting to estimate one overall seemingly unrelated regression means I cannot use
all the data available. Estimating SUR for the maximum possible number of equations –
six – means that only those data are used in the analysis where none of the dependent and
independent variables are missing. That is, only the six-party coalitions in my sample are
analyzed, but not any of the coalitions comprising fewer parties. On the other hand, if
I estimate SUR using three equations, for instance, the model is run on all three-, four-,
five-, and six-party governments. For all coalitions containing more than three parties,
however, the dependencies with parties 4, 5, and 6 are not captured since these parties do
not factor into the estimation. Thus, instead of estimating one SUR analysis on the pooled
sample of all coalitions, I analyze the effect of exit power on portfolio shares for subsam-
ples of coalitions where the number of parties in government, and hence the number of
equations to be estimated, is the same across observations.
While this approach succeeds in accounting for dependencies across observations, it is
hard to compare the effect of the explanatory variables across models, especially because
I estimate them using several different baselines. To aid with comparisons, I also estimate
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a meta-analysis of all the results obtained in the separate SUR models. In addition, I use
a Generalized Estimating Equations on restructured data, which allows me to account for
dependencies across parties while still estimating one model on the pooled data.
4.4.2 Generalized Estimating Equations Model
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) models use a quasi-likelihood approach, as-
suming the variance of the dependent variable “is a known function of its expectation”
rather than specifying the distribution of the dependent variable (Zeger & Liang 1986, p.
122). This means that this approach can be used for a wide range of dependent variables,
including those that are not normally distributed. In addition, GEE models “specify a
‘working’ correlation matrix for the observations”, which leads to consistent estimators
even if the correlation matrix is not correctly specified (Zeger & Liang 1986, p. 122). Fol-
lowing the notation in Zeger and Liang (1986), let xij be an ni × p vector of explanatory
variables and yij be an ni × 1 vector of the dependent variable. In addition,
µi = h(xiβ) and vi = g(µi)/φ,
where φ is “treated as a nuisance parameter” (Zeger & Liang 1986, p. 123). The quasi-
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for k = 1, ...,p. Specifying Ri(α) as the working correlation matrix for each observation of








i Si = 0, (4.3)
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where Si = yi − µi , Di = ∂µi/∂β, and Vi = A1/2i Ri(α)A
1/2
i /φ. Vi is the working covariance
matrix of yi , where Ai is a matrix containing g(µij) as the jth element.
After replacing α with a consistent estimator, the estimate of β, βR, solves the follow-
ing equation for any working correlation matrix R:
K∑
i=1
Ui{β, α̂[β,φ̂(β)]} = 0 (4.4)
To be able to use the GEE model with compositional portfolio shares, I reshape my
data set to include one overall dependent variable that contains all portfolio shares for
all parties in the sample (McDowell 2004). The explanatory variables, however, are kept
separate. The overall structure of the data still resembles the one shown in equation (1),
with the exception that I am now estimating one dependent variable rather than several.
Finally, the data are structured such that coalitions containing the same size are the pan-
els in which different governments are repeated observations over time (McDowell 2004).
In the following analyses, I present a number of different estimation results. First, I
present and discuss the results of regular OLS regressions used in extant studies. Next,
I present results from seemingly unrelated regressions for several subsets of coalitions
where I hold the number of coalition parties constant. That is, I present (SUR) results for
all two-, three-, four-, and five-party coalitions separately. I do not report results of SUR
for six-party coalitions as my data only include a total of six such coalitions. Finally, I
present results from a GEE model and compare the results to those of the SUR and tradi-
tional specification.
4.4.3 Main Independent Variable – Exit Power
In this section, I describe how I measure parties’ relative exit power. I gather all par-
liamentary parties’ number of seats (Döring & Manow 2012; EJPR 1974–2011; Mackie &
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Rose 1991; Nordsieck 1997–2016) and their ideological position on the general left-right
scale (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). Using these data,
I simulate all potential governments that could have formed in developed democracies
during the post-war era. This yields around 120,000 potential governments that include
all single-party governments (minority and majority) up to the government containing all
parliamentary parties. From this novel data set, I estimate each potential government’s
formation likelihood and calculate how attractive it is to each of its members.
To generate the formation likelihood of each of the almost 120,000 potential govern-
ments, I follow Martin and Stevenson’s (2001) approach and estimate a conditional logit
model. Thus, I regress the dummy variable whether or not a government formed on a
number of variables that have been found to affect a potential government’s likelihood
of entering office (see Section 3 above). These explanatory variables include the gov-
ernment’s ideological range and dummy variables indicating its status as a single-party
majority government, surplus government, a minimum winning coalition, and whether
its members are ideologically adjacent to each other (connected). I expect the ideolog-
ical range and a government’s status as a surplus coalition to have a negative effect on
the formation likelihood as both factors complicate reaching compromise. I expect the
remaining variables to have a positive effect as they minimize the cost of governing. The
results of the conditional logit model support these expectations. For each potential gov-
ernment, I generate predicted values from this model that I then use as the measure of
the government’s viability. Viability ranges from zero to one and is constant for each po-
tential government member.
I calculate ideological appeal based on the distance between each potential member of
each potential government and the government’s ideological position. The government’s
ideological position is generated as its center of gravity, that is, as the seat share-weighted
average ideological position. The raw distance between each member’s position and that
of the government indicates the government’s unattractiveness, so for each government’s
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attractiveness, I re-scale the measure, restrict it to positive values and take the square root
of it2.
Finally, I weight each potential government’s formation likelihood by its ideological
appeal to each of its members. This generates the individual expected utility of each po-
tential government to each of its members. As the penultimate step, I sum all expected
utilities of all alternative governments parties can enter, excluding the government that
formed. Finally, since bargaining power is a relative concept, I calculate the share of
exit power each government party controls. That is, I divide each governing party’s exit
power by the sum of all governing parties’ exit power. I compute this new measure of
bargaining power for all parties that were in office in developed democracies between the
first democratic election after the Second World War and 2012. All parties in single-party
majority governments have a relative exit power value of one since no other party con-
tributes to the government’s total exit power. For coalition members, relative exit power
ranges between zero and one. In the following analyses, I use each governing party’s rel-
ative exit power as the main explanatory variable.
4.4.4 Remaining Variables
In the following analyses, the outcome of interest is the number of the ministerial port-
folios each government party receives, weighted by the portfolio’s salience. I gather data
on which government party received which ministry from two different sources. First,
for the period from 1945 to 1998, I obtain portfolio data from Woldendorp et al. (2000).
Second, for the time period between 1998 and 2012, I gather data on the same portfolios
from the Yearly Political Data published for each country in the European Journal of Polit-
2I do this by multiplying the measure by (−1) and adding the observed maximum disutility in each
country. Compared to other measures of parties’ policy positions, such as expert surveys, the CMP data
exhibit more and greater changes in parties’ ideological positions. Moreover, such changes often involve
parties leapfrogging over others. This suggests that changes tend to be over-estimated, so I use the square
root of outside options’ utility to transform the attractiveness measure.
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ical Research3 (EJPR 1974–2011). For the same ministries, I obtain data on their salience
from Druckman and Warwick (2005). To arrive at the dependent variable, I calculate the
salience-weighted share of all portfolios each government party controls. As explained
above, I expect each government party’s share of salience-weighted portfolios to increase
in its relative exit power.
These salience values are based on expert surveys and cover Western European coun-
tries that are characterized by frequent multiparty governments (Druckman & Warwick
2005). Therefore, my final sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Swe-
den for the time period between 1945 or the first democratic election and 2012. The main
explanatory variable is each government party’s relative Exit Power as described above.
In addition, I test for the effect of each party’s share of government seats, Government
Seat Share, and its status as the Prime Minister’s party, PM. Moreover, I generate a variable




Table 1 provides summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the follow-
ing analyses. These values are based on the full pooled model that will be used to repli-
cate existing study results. The unit of observation here is the government party. Parties’
relative exit power ranges from 0.02 to 0.98 with a mean of 0.34 (see Table 1). The average
of government parties’ seat shares is also 0.34, however, seat shares vary more with the
3These portfolios cover the Prime Ministership and the Deputy Prime Minister as well as the Foreign,
Defense, Interior, Justice, Finance, Economic, Labor, Education, Health, Housing, Agriculture, Industry
and Trade, Environment, Social Affairs, and Public Works ministries (Woldendorp et al. 2000).
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minimum at 0.007 and the maximum at 0.97. Parties’ lagged salience-weighted portfolio
shares range from 0 to one, with a mean at 0.24, which is lower than both the average of
relative exit power and seat shares. Finally, of the 780 government parties in my sample,
250 held the Prime Minister’s position.
Figures 1 through 3 graph the relationship between parties’ salience-weighted share
of portfolios and exit power and seat shares, respectively. In each graph, the left panel
plots the salience-weighted share of portfolios and parties’ government seat shares, while
the right panel plots parties’ exit power. Figure 1 plots the relationship for all govern-
ment parties, Figure 2 for the Prime Minister’s party, and Figure 3 for all parties not
controlling the Prime Ministership.
Table 4.1: Summary Satistics – Explanatory Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Exit Power 0.338 0.160 0.024 0.976 780
Government Seat Share 0.340 0.241 0.007 0.971 780
Portfolio Sharet−1 0.239 0.274 0 1 780
Figure 1 shows that observations for all parties fall closer to the 45 degree line when
using parties’ seat shares, however, the relationship is not as indicative of a proportional
relationship as one would expect based on existing results. Using parties’ exit poewr,
there are a number of observations that fall far from the 45 degree line. There are many
observations that fall below it for parties scoring between 0.2 and 0.4 exit power and
many that fall above the line for parties scoring between 0.2 and 0.6 in exit power. Re-
stricting the sample to parties that held the Prime Minister’s position, the relationship is
closer to the expected proportional one when using parties’ seat shares. Using parties’
relative exit power, there are many parties that receive a share of portfolios that is greater
than their share of exit power. Finally, restricting the sample to parties not controlling
the Prime Ministership, there is a considerable number of parties that score between 0.2
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Figure 4.1: Share of Salience-Weighted Portfolios – All Parties
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Figure 4.2: Share of Salience-Weighted Portfolios – PM Parties
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Figure 4.3: Share of Salience-Weighted Portfolios – non-PM Parties
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and 0.4 in exit power but receive a smaller share of portfolios. In contrast, using seat
shares, there are many parties that score between zero and 0.3 in seat shares but receive
a greater than proportional share of portfolios.
4.5.2 Standard Specification
In this section, I first present results of standard OLS models regressing the salience-
weighted share of portfolios on each government party’s relative exit power and its seat
share, its status as the Prime Minister’s party as well as its portfolio share in the pre-
ceding government. Here the unit of observation is each party in government, and the
sample is restricted to coalition governments. All explanatory variables that are included
in these models have a positive effect on the salience-weighted share of portfolios, and
all achieve statistical significance at the one percent level. Models 1 and 2 include exit
power as the main explanatory variable, while Models 3 and 4 include each party’s share
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of government seats. Moreover, Models 2 and 4 include parties’ previous portfolio share
as an additional exlanatory variable.
Increasing a party’s exit power by one standard deviation increases the share of salience-
weighted portfolios it receives by 0.07 and 0.05, respectively. In contrast, increasing par-
ties’ share of government seats by one standard deviation increases the share of salience-
weighted portfolios by 0.15 and 0.12, respectively. Parties’ share of seats not only has a
bigger effect than relative exit power, it also explains more of the variation in the alloca-
tion of ministries – 68% and 72%, respectively, compared to 55% and 64%. In addition,
controlling for different measures of bargaining power, holding the Prime Ministership
still has a positive effect, albeit smaller when using seat shares. The magnitude of the
coefficient ranges between 0.11 and 0.29, suggesting that the Prime Minister’s party, in
fact, receives a bonus in portfolio shares. This lends support to claims that formateur par-
ties receive a greater share of portfolios, and particularly more important ones (Baron &
Ferejohn 1989). Moreover, even after controlling for parties’ bargaining power and their
status as the Prime Minister’s party, the lagged portfolio share has a positive effect. Thus,
parties tend to not do worse than in the previous government when they return to office.
These results are robust to the inclusion of country-fixed effects as well as the in-
teraction between the party’s status as the Prime Minister’s party and exit power and
seat shares, respectively. Estimation results are reported in Table 6 in Appendix 1. As
mentioned above, however, analyzing compositional data using OLS leads to biased and
inefficient results. Due to this, predicted portfolio shares could fall outside the range of
possible values, taking predicted values greater than one or smaller than zero. Therefore,
in the next section, I present results from separate seemingly unrelated regression analy-
ses.
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Table 4.2: The Effect of Exit Power and Seat Share on Weighted Portfolio Shares
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Exit Power 0.442∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0343)
Government Seat Share 0.606∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0270)
PM 0.288∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0131)
Portfolio Sharet−1 0.293∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0198)
Constant 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0857∗∗∗ 0.0952∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0118) (0.00834) (0.00788)
R2 0.549 0.638 0.681 0.718
Observations 780 780 780 780
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.5.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regression
In this section, I present results from a number of seemingly unrelated regression
models where I hold the number of parties constant at two, three, four, and five coali-
tion parties. Thus, the unit of observation now is the (two-, three-, four-, and five-party)
government in office. As mentioned above, I do not estimate seemingly unrelated regres-
sions for six-party governments since my sample only includes six such coalitions. There
are two to five dependent variables, and I estimate the salience-weighted portfolio share
for all coalition members simultaneously. As described above, I transform the depen-
dent variables as the logged odds ratios of all portfolio shares relative to a baseline share.
Following recent research, I estimate several models using each party’s portfolio share
as the baseline category once (Philips et al. 2016). I report results for models including
only parties’ exit power or seat shares and their status as the Prime Minister’s party, not
including country-fixed effects or their previous portfolio share. This is due to the fact
that I lose many observations by reshaping the data such that each government in office
in now the unit of observation. I report the results in Appendix 2.
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Since the coefficients are hard to interpret given the transformation of the dependent
variables, I focus on discussing broad patterns and some illustrative examples. Table 3 re-
ports the direction and statistical significance of the effect of parties’ relative exit power.
Parties 1 through 5 are ordered by their strength in relative exit power, with party one
being the strongest, party two the second-strongest, etc. Table 4 provides examples how
portfolios are allocated across parties in coalitions of different size.
Table 4.3: Effect of Exit Power on Portfolio Shares
2-party coalitions
Party 1 Party 2
Rel. Party 1 +
to Party 2 +
3-party coalitions
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
Party 1 +∗∗ −
Rel. Party 2 +∗ −
to Party 3 +∗ +
4-party coalitions
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4
Party 1 +∗∗ + −
Rel. Party 2 +∗∗ − −
to Party 3 + + −
Party 4 +∗ + −
5-party coalitions
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5
Party 1 + + + −∗
Rel. Party 2 + + + −∗∗
to Party 3 + + − −∗
Party 4 +∗∗ + + −∗∗∗
Party 5 + + + −
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3 shows that, relative to all parties’ portfolio shares, exit power has a consis-
tently positive effect on the share of salience-weighted portfolios the two strongest par-
ties receive. This effect reaches statistical significance for half the coefficients for the
strongest party but less often for the second-strongest party. This lends some support to
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the proposition derived above. In three-, four-, and five-party coalitions, exit power has a
consistently negative effect on the share of portfolios the weakest party receives relative
to all of its partners’ shares. This effect reaches statistical significance for the weakest
party in five-party coalitions. In four- and five-party coalitions, the effect of exit power
on the portfolio share of the second-weakest party relative to all others is mixed. This
does not support the above proposition. These results, however, show that the effect of
exit power on salience-weighted portfolio shares is not the same for all parties in govern-
ment – a pattern the standard specification cannot uncover. Using parties’ seat shares, on
the other hand, has a consistently positive effect on the share of portfolios they receive
relative to their partners’ shares (see Appendix 2).
Table 4 provides examples of portfolio allocations for different coalition sizes, chang-
ing each coalition member’s exit power. For two-party governments, I increase Party 1’s
exit power from 0.5 to 0.75 and, hence, decrease Party 2’s share from 0.5 to 0.25. For
three- to five-party coalitions, I increase Party 1’s exit power from 0.4 to 0.6. The remain-
ing parties’ exit power is kept equal, dividing the remaining 0.6 and 0.4 equally among
them. That is, in three-party coalitions, the weaker two parties’ exit power decreases from
0.3 to 0.2; in four-party coalitions, it decreases from 0.2 to 0.13; and in five-party coali-
tions, it decreases from 0.15 to 0.1. I follow the same procedure as described in Chapter
III, Section 5.2 to calculate the allocation of salience-weighted portfolios.
Increasing the strongest party’s relative exit power by half of the original share has the
biggest effect in three- and four-party governments and the smallest in two-party govern-
ments. In a two-party government, increasing the strongest party’s exit power from 0.5
to 0.75 increases the share of salience-weighted portfolios it receives from 0.65 to 0.66.
Reducing the weaker partners exit power from 0.5 to 0.25 has the mirror effect of de-
creasing its portfolio share from 0.35 to 0.34. Changing the strongest party’s relative exit
power from 0.4 to 0.6, in contrast, leads its portfolio share to increase by 0.11 from 0.55 to
0.66 in three-party coalitions and from 0.53 to 0.64 in four-party coalitions. At the same
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time, in three-party governments, reducing Party 2 and Party 3’s relative exit power from
0.3 to 0.2 decreases their portfolio share from 0.26 to 0.17 for the former and from 0.19
to 0.15 for the latter. Reducing the relative exit power from 0.2 to 0.13 for the weaker
parties in four-party coalitions decreases their portfolio share by between 0.02 and 0.06.
In four-party governments, the decrease is biggest for the second-strongest party.
Table 4.4: Change in Portfolio Allocation
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5
2-party coalitions
Exit Power Party 1: 0.5 0.65 0.35
Exit Power Party 1: 0.75 0.66 0.34
3-party coalitions
Exit Power Party 1: 0.4 0.55 0.26 0.19
Exit Power Party 1: 0.6 0.66 0.17 0.15
4-party coalitions
Exit Power Party 1: 0.4 0.53 0.15 0.16 0.16
Exit Power Party 1: 0.6 0.64 0.09 0.13 0.14
5-party coalitions
Exit Power Party 1: 0.4 0.83 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06
Exit Power Party 1: 0.6 0.88 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08
Only Party 1 held as PM
Finally, in five-party governments the same change in relative exit power of the strongest
party still increases its portfolio share but by less than in three- and four-party govern-
ments. Here, its salience-weighted portfolio share increases from 0.83 to 0.88. Decreasing
its partners’ exit power from 0.15 to 0.1 reduces the share of portfolios Parties 2, 3, and 4
hold by 0.02 and 0.01. For Party 5, however, this change in exit power leads to an increase
in its portfolio share from 0.06 to 0.08. This is consistent with the results shown in Table
3, and it is the only effect that is inconsistent with the expectation that appears in these
sample portfolio allocations.
In coalitions of all sizes, the share of salience-weighted portolios the strongest party
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receives is greater than its share of exit power. This ‘bonus’ is greatest in five-party gov-
ernments and smallest in four-party coalitions. Part of this dyanmic is likely due to the
fact that I set the strongest party to also hold the Prime Ministership, while its partners
do not control this most important post.
4.5.4 Aggregate Results
As discussed before, seemingly unrelated regressions cannot be used with irregular
and unbalanced compositional data. The first approach to use all of the existing data to
analyze the effect of parties’ exit power on portfolio shares is to estimate separate seem-
ingly unrelated regressions on subsamples of the data where the number of government
parties, and thus, the number of equations to be estimated is held constant. However,
comparing results across these different models is complicated, making it hard to eval-
uate the support for the hypothesis derived above. One way to better compare results
across these subsamples is to estimate a meta-analysis of the separate results.
Figure 4 plots the results of a meta-analysis of the results of separate SUR models. The
forest plot graphs the estimated effect of exit power on portfolio shares for each subgroup
and the estimated overall effect. The subgroups here are coalitions of different size, rang-
ing from two- to five-party governments. Since the dependent variables of the separate
SUR models are logged odds ratios, I plot exponentiated estimates. The effect of par-
ties’ exit power on the salience-weighted portfolio share they receive is positive for two-,
three-, and four-party governments, while the effect is negative for five-party coalitions.
However, the effect is not statistically significant from zero for the smallest and largest
coalitions. The overall effect of exit power for is positive and statistically significantly
different from zero. This pattern is similar to the one found when calculating different
portfolio allocations for varying distributions of exit power in Table 4, however, from the
forest plot it is unclear which subset of parties is driving the overall results.
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Figure 4.4: Forest Plot of Meta-Analysis Results
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.093
Overall  (I−squared = 38.0%, p = 0.009)
Subtotal  (I−squared = 0.0%, p = 0.816)
4−Party Coalitions
5−Party Coalitions
Subtotal  (I−squared = 29.5%, p = 0.156)
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In this section, I also present results from the second approach described in Section
4.4, a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model for which I restructure the portfolio
data by following the steps described in McDowell (2004). As discussed above, when per-
forming SUR analyses on all available dependent variables, I lose observations because
the dependent and independent variables are missing where certain coalition parties sim-
ply do not exist. However, I can restructure the data in such a way to arrive at a matrix
as described in Section 4 and perform GEE analysis on this new data set that will in fact
use all available observations, and that will allow for correlation across equations. First,
in my SUR data set containing separate dependent variables for the share of portfolios of
Parties 1 through 5, I estimate simple OLS models regressing the portfolio share on exit
power and each party’s status as the Prime Minister’s party. Next, I rescale the dependent
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and independent variables “using their respective regression root mean squared error”
(McDowell 2004, p. 444). This step is needed to allow for heteroskedasticity in the GEE
model, which generally assumes homoskedasticity. In addition, I generate a constant that
“will be used instead of a single intercept” in the GEE model (McDowell 2004, p. 445).
Using these re-scaled variables, I reshape the data to resemble the matrix in equation (1)
Section 4.4 and estimate a GEE model. The only difference is that I analyze only one de-
pendent variable. The results are presented in Table 5.
The number of observations in Table 5 is the same as in Table 2, so the transformation
of the data, indeed, allows all observations to be used. For Parties 1 through 4, exit power
has a positive effect on the salience-weighted portfolio share, while it has a negative ef-
fect for Party 5. The magnitude of the effects of the three strongest parties’ exit power is
similar to the magnitude of the overall effect of exit power in the standard specification
reported in Table 2. The magnitude of this effect for the strongest party is smaller than
in the standard specification, while the magnitude is bigger for the second and – where
it exists – the third-strongest party. All three coefficients reach statistical significance
at least at the five percent level. While the effect of Party 4’s relative exit power on its
salience-weighted portfolio share is positive, it is smaller than the effect of the stronger
parties’ exit power and smaller than the effect in the standard specification. The effect
does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. All of these differences in
how parties’ exit power affects how many portfolios they receive and how important they
are are masked in the standard specification where I use one explanatory variable for all
parties’ exit power, not differentiating between them. These results lend some support to
the hypothesis derived above that the share of salience-weighted portfolios increases in
parties’ relative exit power.
Where it exists, an increase in Party 5’s exit power leads to a decrease in the share
of portfolios it receives. The effect is statistically significant at the ten percent level.
This pattern is the same as can be seen in Table 3, where, in five-party governments, the
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weakest party’s share of portfolios decreases relative to all other parties’ shares as its exit
power increases. While separate SUR results and the GEE model uncover this dynamic,
it is again not obvious from results using the standard specifications. This result does
not lend support to the expectation derived above. Finally, each party’s status as the
Prime Minister’s party has a consistently positive and statistically significant effect on its
salience-weighted share of portfolios. The magnitude of the effect is bigger than the effect
in the standard specification.
To conclude, this approach of using a GEE model on one common dependent vari-
able and separate independent variables for each coalition party has clear advantages.
Doing so means that all observations that are non-missing in the pooled, government
party-based data set can be analyzed together in one model. Compared to the standard
specification, it uncovers more fine-grained variation in the effect that exit power has on
portfolio concessions for different parties because the independent variables are kept sep-
arately. Compared to separate SUR models, this approach makes comparisons of effects
across different parties easier. The results of the GEE model are similar to the results
found in meta-analysis of all SUR results and shown in Figure 4 above. The forest plot
shows that the overall effect of exit power is greatest for three- and four-party coalitions.
However, the results from the meta-analysis do not resolve if all or some parties are driv-
ing these results and, if so, which ones. The GEE model discussed in this section, on the
other hand, provides such finer-grained results. In sum, this final approach to estimating
unbalanced and irregular compositional data combines the advantages of the SUR and
traditional specification.
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6 Conclusion
To summarize, in this chapter, I use and discuss two approaches to analyze unbal-
anced and irregular compositional data to answer why some coalition partners receive
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more, and more important, portfolios than others. Parties’ portfolios are the most im-
mediate manifestation of the bargaining leverage they hold over their partners. Existing
research posits that parties’ bargaining power, and thus their ability to receive many and
important portfolios, derives from their size in terms of parliamentary seats or their role
as the agenda-setter. In contrast, I argue that parties’ ability to credibly threaten to aban-
don coalition negotiations determines how many portfolios they can receive and how
salient they are. Parties can only credibly threaten to do so if they can enter negotiations
over at least one alternative government that is viable and ideologically attractive. As
such, I expect parties to receive a greater share of salience-weighted portfolios, the more
exit power they have. I use a novel measure of exit power as the main explanatory vari-
able. This measure is theoretically motivated and comparable across countries and over
time.
Coalition parties’ portfolio shares are compositional data and should be modeled ac-
cordingly. Given a limited number of portfolios that can be divided between several
parties, one party receiving more portfolios means there are fewer left for the remain-
ing parties to obtain. Using standard OLS regressions with such data leads to inefficient
and biased results. Portfolio shares, however, present a unique methodological challenge
since the ministerial posts are not always divided between the same number of coali-
tion parties. Rather, the number of coalition parties varies; in my sample, it ranges from
two to six. While seemingly unrelated regressions can account for dependencies across
observations, and thus, equations, they cannot be used with irregular and unbalanced
compositional data since the number of equations to be estimated is not the same for
each observation, i.e. government.
Rather than using the standard OLS specification used in existing research, I use two
approaches to analyze what determines government parties’ portfolio shares. First, I es-
timate seemingly unrelated regressions for subsamples where the number of government
parties is held constant. This allows me to examine trade-offs in portfolio shares between
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individual coalition members. However, it makes comparisons across parties and gov-
ernment sizes hard. I find that, in coalitions of all sizes, exit power has a consistently
positive effect on parties’ portfolio shares for the strongest and second-strongest party in
government. For the weaker parties in three-, four-, and five-party coalitions, the results
are mixed, with exit power sometimes having a negative effect on salience-weighted port-
folio shares. Performing a meta-analysis on all results obtained from the separate SUR
estimations shows that exit power has an overall positive effect on portfolio shares. The
effect is biggest for three- and four-party coalitions.
Second, I estimate a generalized estimating equations model where I enter explana-
tory variables separately for each coalition party. This model still allows for dependencies
across parties in the same coalition. I find that for the strongest four parties, exit power
has a positive effect on the share of salience-weighted portfolios they receive. In five-
party governments, exit power has a negative effect on the salience-weighted portfolio
shares the weakest party receives. This model uses all observations in one model, which
makes comparisons across parties and governments of different size easier.
Both approaches show dynamics in the allocation of portfolios that the standard spec-
ification does not. Both show that the magnitude of the effect exit power has on salience-
weighted portfolio shares is not the same across all coalition parties. In fact, the effect is
bigger and statistically significant for the strongest parties in office. Moreover, both ap-
proaches show that the effect is negative for the weakest party in five-party governments.
In addition, SUR models show that the effect of exit power is negative for the weakest
parties in three- and four-party governments as well. While the GEE model does not
uncover this dynamic, the ease of interpretation and easy re-structuring of data make it
a valuable approach to appropriately modeling unbalanced and irregular compositional
data.
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4.7 Appendix 5: Robustness Check OLS
Table 4.6: A1: Exit Power and Seat Shares and Portfolio Allocation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Exit Power 0.454∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.0542) (0.0493)
PM 0.319∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0261)
PM * Exit Power -0.0952 -0.114∗
(0.0751) (0.0675)
Government Seat Share 0.600∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.0356) (0.0350)
PM * Seat Share 0.00817 -0.0203
(0.0558) (0.0530)
Portfolio Sharet−1 0.291∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0199)
Constant 0.108∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0312) (0.0262) (0.0248)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 780 780 780 780
R2 0.574 0.656 0.710 0.740
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.8 Appendix 6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results
Table 4.7: The Effect of Exit Power and Seat Share – All 2-Party Coalitions
Party 2 relative to Party 1 Party 1 relative to Party 2
Exit Power 0.0991 0.321
(0.703) (0.651)
Seat Share 2.358∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.322)
PM 1.032∗∗∗ 0.263∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.131) (0.155) (0.123) (0.147)
Constant -0.682∗∗ -1.320∗∗∗ -0.527 -1.174∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.117) (0.410) (0.151)
Observations 109 109 108 108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: The Effect of Exit Power – All 3-Party Coalitions
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 2 Party 3 Party 1 Party 3 Party 1 Party 2
relative to Party 1 relative to Party 2 relative to Party 3
Exit Power 5.560∗∗ -0.412 2.977∗ -0.796 2.953∗ 0.235
(2.355) (2.066) (1.555) (2.400) (1.731) (3.361)
PM 0.620∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.482
(0.275) (0.303) (0.212) (0.315) (0.239) (0.360)
Constant -2.430∗∗∗ -0.901∗ -1.199∗ -0.255 -1.100 0.0377
(0.765) (0.542) (0.641) (0.623) (0.728) (1.087)
Observations 51 50 50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.9: The Effect of Seat Share – All 3-Party Coalitions
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 2 Party 3 Party 1 Party 3 Party 1 Party 2
relative to Party 1 relative to Party 2 relative to Party 3
Seat Share 4.024∗∗∗ 4.041∗∗∗ 2.618∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗ 2.184∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗
(0.526) (0.693) (0.396) (0.807) (0.498) (0.764)
PM 0.0659 0.319 -0.0401 0.560 0.312 -0.300
(0.226) (0.357) (0.192) (0.413) (0.248) (0.330)
Constant -1.518∗∗∗ -1.769∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗
(0.137) (0.166) (0.173) (0.200) (0.215) (0.210)
Observations 51 50 50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: The Effect of Exit Power – 4-Party Coalitions, Part I
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 1 Party 3 Party 4
relative to Party 1 relative to Party 2
Exit Power 5.794∗∗ 0.383 -0.753 3.631∗∗ -2.872 -3.466
(2.520) (3.349) (2.862) (1.546) (3.159) (2.745)
PM 0.915∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.287) (0.328) (0.221) (0.270) (0.292)
Constant -2.306∗∗∗ -1.048 -0.751 -0.887∗ 0.355 0.348
(0.690) (0.781) (0.528) (0.510) (0.734) (0.501)
Observations 43 45
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.11: The Effect of Exit Power – 4-Party Coalitions, Part II
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 1 Party 2 Party 4 Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
relative to Party 3 relative to Party 4
Exit Power 2.639 3.713 -1.695 2.572∗ 3.753 -2.203
(1.659) (2.799) (2.599) (1.557) (2.838) (3.158)
PM 0.412∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.252) (0.296) (0.223) (0.253) (0.273)
Constant -0.304 -0.980 0.175 -0.362 -1.021 0.304
(0.552) (0.768) (0.479) (0.515) (0.779) (0.733)
Observations 43 44
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.12: The Effect of Seat Share – 4-Party Coalitions, Part I
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 1 Party 3 Party 4
relative to Party 1 relative to Party 2
Seat Share 3.528∗∗∗ 3.804∗∗∗ 4.388∗∗∗ 2.757∗∗∗ 3.785∗∗∗ 3.848∗∗∗
(0.819) (0.833) (0.803) (0.600) (0.748) (0.727)
PM 0.316 0.396 0.223 0.00478 0.469∗ 0.323
(0.255) (0.282) (0.287) (0.212) (0.252) (0.265)
Constant -1.382∗∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗ -1.547∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗ -0.945∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.185) (0.166) (0.231) (0.160) (0.156)
Observations 43 45
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.13: The Effect of Seat Share – 4-Party Coalitions, Part II
Portfolio Share of ...
Party 1 Party 2 Party 4 Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
relative to Party 3 relative to Party 4
Seat Share 3.346∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗∗ 3.432∗∗∗ 2.993∗∗∗ 2.958∗∗∗ 3.898∗∗∗
(0.620) (0.865) (0.783) (0.596) (0.830) (0.806)
PM -0.0113 0.148 0.428 0.00647 0.347 0.335
(0.221) (0.266) (0.275) (0.211) (0.260) (0.269)
Constant -0.644∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗∗ -0.645∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.199) (0.172) (0.238) (0.191) (0.176)
Observations 43 44
Standard errors in parentheses
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